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Abstract 
DoD faces significant challenges in delivering promising new technologies to 
service members quickly and cost-effectively.  To better understand DOD’s 
technology adoption challenges, we review the technology diffusion literature to 
identify factors associated with successful and unsuccessful technology adoption 
processes, conduct case studies of DoD’s advanced technology programs and 
propose a conceptual technology adoption model.   
The literature review identifies three overarching factors reflecting the 
complexities of defense technology adoption: benefit-cost uncertainty, organizational 
externalities, and direct and indirect network externalities.  Technology adoption 
clearly involves benefit and cost uncertainties.  Organizational externalities arise 
because there are typically multiple stakeholders from different DoD constituencies.  
Direct and indirect network externalities reflect the joint and interrelated nature of 
defense technologies on the battlefield. 
A closer look at one of DoD’s advanced technology development programs 
indicates that success factors in this program  generally parallel the results of the 
literature survey: the importance of benefit-cost uncertainty, management 
commitment (organizational externalities), technology champion (network 
externalities) and the prospects for future technology transfer (network externalities).   
Finally, we present conceptual technology adoption models incorporating 
benefit-cost uncertainty, organizational externalities and network externalities.  
These models can explain the diffusion patterns observed in the defense 
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Executive Summary 
The diffusion of a new private sector technology across a group of end-users 
is thought to follow a normally distributed “bell curve” pattern.  Geoffrey Moore 
separates the Technology Adoption Lifecycle (TAL) into five end-user categories 
spread over this bell curve, based on the end-users’ characteristics and motivations 
(Moore, 1999).  Starting from the left and earliest adopters, these categories include: 
the Innovators, the Early Adopters, the Early Majority, the Late Majority, and finally 
the Laggards. 
The “Technology Adoption Chasm” refers to the gap in the TAL between the 
Early Adopters and the Early Majority and is sometimes referred to as the “Valley of 
Death” (VoD), particularly within the DoD.  The chasm reflects the significant barriers 
confronted as technologies advance from the Early Adopters to the Early Majority 
phases.  The problems occur when the relevant decision makers don’t recognize the 
distinct motivations and characteristics of the Early Majority compared to those of 
the Early Adopters.  However, after crossing the chasm and seducing the Early 
Majority the new technology often embarks on a self-propagating path towards 
complete diffusion. 
Technology transfer in the Department of Defense, getting new and improved 
weapon systems into the hands of our war-fighters, has been a persistent problem.  
For example, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), more 
recently re-designated Joint Concept Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs), have 
been introduced to help facilitate the technology transfer process.  ACTDs programs 
are designed to demonstrate commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies that can 
be quickly modified to serve joint service requirements.  Unfortunately, ACTDs have 
experienced trouble crossing the technology adoption “chasm”.  
This research examines the Technology Adoption Lifecycle and the Chasm 
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context.  Crossing the DoD’s Technology Adoption Chasm involves aligning the 
incentives for each stakeholder in the decision-maker/buyer/end-user chain.  To 
better understand DOD’s technology adoption challenges, we review the academic 
technology diffusion literature to identify the factors associated with successful and 
unsuccessful technology adoption processes.  The literature identifies a wide range 
of factors—many of which were inapplicable to the defense context and others of 
which, while applicable, provided no normative implications and thus were irrelevant 
from a policy perspective.  Six factors seem particularly critical for a technology’s 
ability to cross the Technology Adoption Chasm: resolving benefit-cost uncertainty; 
overcoming concerns about losing decision-making control; correcting misaligned 
incentives among different stakeholders within the organization; securing 
management commitment; identifying a clear technology champion; and ensuring a 
sufficiently large installed base of users for complementary goods and services. 
These six factors are further consolidated into three overarching factors: 
benefit-cost uncertainty, organizational and other simple externalities, and direct and 
indirect network externalities.  These three factors capture the complexities of the 
defense technology adoption process that involves multiple decision-makers (the 
joint staff that determines defense requirements, the service sponsors that manage 
the acquisition process and influence the resource allocation process, and the end-
users or warfighters that actually adopt and use the new technology).  Developing 
technologies clearly involve benefit and cost uncertainties.  Organizational 
externalities arise when there are multiple stakeholders from different constituencies 
within DoD.  Direct and indirect network externalities reflect the joint nature of many 
DoD technologies (fully exploiting their potential requires adoption beyond a single 
service or a single command within a service) and the interrelated nature of defense 
technologies on the battlefield (most defense technologies require significant 
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A closer look at the ACTD/JCTD program indicates that experience in this 
program is generally consistent with the factors identified in the literature survey: the 
importance of benefit-cost uncertainty, management commitment (organizational 
externalities), technology champion (network externalities) and expectations about 
the prospects for future technology transfer (network externalities).  These were the 
primary significant variables in these cases, indicating that our literature search 
focused on the appropriate variables. 
The research concludes by presenting conceptual technology adoption 
models that incorporated benefit-cost uncertainty, organizational externalities and 
network externalities.  These models are capable of explaining the diffusion patterns 
observed in both the private sector and the defense department: no adoption, full 
adoption, partial adoption and partial adoption/de-adoption.  To fully test these 
models requires an appropriately designed set of economic experiments.  An 
experimental model was described to provide this validation.  Future research will 
conduct the suggested economic experiments.  If these models are validated, they 
can become the foundation for further experiments and simulations to explore policy 
options the defense department can consider to help defense technologies cross the 
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Introduction 
In the world of technology adoption, a chasm exists between the technology 
enthusiasts and the practical professionals of an industry who attempt to capture 
and leverage the benefits of new technologies for their field.  In the private sector, a 
technology is considered to have crossed the chasm when it is on a self-sustaining 
path towards diffusion across the population of users.  There is ample literature in 
the private sector about factors that help a new technology cross the chasm.   
The public sector also tries to leverage benefits of new technologies but has 
its own set of challenges to overcome in this process.  For example, consider the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  Within the DoD, the Advanced Systems and 
Concepts Office (under the Office of Acquisition Technology and Logistics) sponsors 
10 technology transition programs.  One office in particular—the Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) office (formerly the Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program)—has the explicit goal of placing 
technologies into the hands of the warfighter in 2-4 years; it strives to accomplish 
this objective in a cooperative effort between the Joint Combatant Commanders and 
the funding Services.   
The ACTD/JCTD program takes commercial off-the-shelf technologies that 
can be adapted to defense applications.  The program demonstrates the 
technologies in defense applications and then attempts to insert them into the formal 
defense acquisition process.  To enter the ACTD/JCTD program, the technologies 
need to secure one of the services as their funding and lifecycle sponsor. 
While lofty in its temporal goals, the ACTD/JCTD office has its own unique 
transition challenges (GAO, 1998; 2002).  The research presented in this report was 
motivated largely by the difficulties the ACTD/JCTD program has experienced in the 
technology transfer and adoption process.  The program has had difficulty 
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Postgraduate School (NPS) is helping to address this by developing business cases 
to augment the technology demonstrations.  This research asks if there are other 
issues that might also facilitate technology transfer in the defense department. 
As the researchers looked beyond the ACTD/JCTD program, we found more 
generic problems across DoD.  Technologies such as NMCI (GAO, 2006b; Perkins, 
2005), RFID (Solis, 2006; GAO, 2005) and Land Warrior (Shachtman, 2007) also 
have diffusion issues; they have been adopted by end-users, but they are less than 
successful in that diffusion.  It appears that technology transfer, both within DoD and 
the private sector, follows at least four diffusion patterns: no adoption, partial 
adoption, complete adoption and partial adoption/de-adoption.  We want to develop 
a model that can explain these paths for potentially cost-effective technologies.  This 
research does not look specifically for ways to streamline the acquisition process; it 
looks at factors that inhibit military end-users from successfully adopting new 
technologies. 
Specifically, this research explores the well-known Technology Adoption 
Lifecycle (TAL) and technology transfer literature to identify the factors contributing 
to the observed adoption patterns.  This model is compared to case studies from the 
private sector and a detailed analysis of experience from the ACTD program to 
ensure consistency with experiential evidence.  Finally, it outlines a model for future 
analysis using experimental economics to verify that the issues identified are 
consistent with the observed technology diffusion patterns, after which policy can be 
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The Technology Adoption Chasm 
The Technology Adoption Lifecycle (TAL) 
The diffusion of a new technology across a group of end-users is thought to 
follow a normally distributed “bell curve” pattern.  Geoffrey Moore separates the 
Technology Adoption Lifecycle (TAL) into five end-user categories spread over this 
bell curve, based on the end-users’ characteristics and motivations (Moore, 1999).  
Starting from the left and earliest adopters, these categories include: the Innovators, 
the Early Adopters, the Early Majority, the Late Majority, and finally the Laggards.   
 
Figure 1. Technology Adoption Lifecycle   
(Moore, 1999) 
The Innovators are also known as Technology Enthusiasts.  They are excited 
by a new technological break-through; they are not as concerned with monetary 
returns as they are with the potential for innovation.  The Innovators want to 
experiment with the new technology as soon as possible to learn its potential.  
These end-users represent the segment below the second standard deviation, 
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The Early Adopters are also known as the Visionaries.  These end-users see 
value for the new technology within their industry and want to capitalize on the 
savings or new capabilities before their competitors or colleagues.  They are willing 
to risk technical immaturity, recognizing that not all aspects of the new technology 
have yet been worked out.  These adopters are willing to risk embracing an 
immature industry standard, as the best technology has often not been developed or 
optimized for the industry.  These end-users fill the section of the bell curve between 
the first and second standard deviations below the mean.  These first two segments 
together—the Innovators and the Early Adopters—are referred to as the Early 
Market; the remaining segments—the Early Majority, Late Majority, and Laggards— 
are referred to as the Late Market (Moore, 1999). 
Members of the Early Majority are also known as the Pragmatists.  These 
end-users are much more conservative than the Early Adopters.  They are receptive 
to new technology, but they are not as resolute as the first two groups and are highly 
influenced by their peers.  The Early Majority is more conservative and risk-averse.  
Members of this group want to ensure that the new technology fits their 
organization’s needs, has wide utility across their industry, and is a good and mature 
product for the job.  They do not want to commit to an untested technology that may 
have imperfections reducing its efficiency or efficacy, or that is not the technology 
the competitive market will embrace (socially optimal).  These end-users fill the bell 
curve from the first standard deviation below the mean to the mean. 
The Late Majority is made up of Conservatives.  These adopters value 
tradition over progress and resist discontinuous innovation (an innovation that 
changes processes or procedures and disrupts an organization).  They won’t commit 
to a new technology until they are certain technological and economic uncertainties 
have been resolved; they will wait until it is professionally uncomfortable in their 
industry to remain loyal to the old technology.  These end-users fill the bell curve 
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The final group is the Laggards, also known as the Skeptics.  Its members will 
stubbornly resist the new technology until forced to change to stay in business or 
simply to function (Moore, 1999). 
The Technology Adoption Chasm 
The “Technology Adoption Chasm” refers to the gap in the TAL between the 
Early Adopters and the Early Majority and is sometimes referred to as the “Valley of 
Death” (VoD), particularly within the DoD.  The chasm reflects the significant barriers 
confronted as technologies advance from the Early Adopters to the Early Majority 
phases.  The problems occur when businesses and marketers don’t recognize the 
distinct motivations and characteristics of the Early Majority compared to those of 
the Early Adopters.  However, the new technology often embarks on a self-
propagating path towards complete diffusion after crossing the chasm and seducing 
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There are fundamental differences between the Early Adopters (Visionaries) 
and the Early Majority (Pragmatists) that present a significant challenge for 
technologies crossing the adoption chasm.  In general, members of the Early 
Majority have a stronger interest in the net benefits the technology offers their 
industry; the Early Adopters are more interested in experimenting with new 
technologies and innovations despite the uncertainties involved.  This difference in 
priorities contributes to the observation that the Early Majority is populated by 
pragmatists rather than technology enthusiasts or visionaries. 
Secondly, members of the pragmatic Early Majority value their peers’ 
opinions and experiences far more than their own desire to remain on the cutting 
edge of technology.  In other words, they are a self-referencing group (Moore, 1999).  
To break into this end-user segment, a product needs to secure Early Majority 
supporters who can recommend it to their peers.  This creates a Catch-22: How can 
one secure Early Majority supporters if those supporters won’t adopt without Early 
Majority peers to recommend the product?  In contrast, the visionary Early Adopters 
are anxious to be amongst the first within their industry to embrace a new 
technology.   
Thirdly, pragmatists are more acutely aware of the existing industry 
infrastructure and are wary of discontinuous innovations that would disrupt 
operations and productivity; visionaries are less respectful of established standards 
and infrastructure—they are excited about new technology and eager to adopt it 
regardless of incompatibility with existing infrastructure, disruptions to operations, or 
uncertainty regarding technological or economic performance. 
Finally, the Early Majority thoroughly investigates the technological and 
economic uncertainties surrounding a new technology.  Its members want to validate 
its overall value to the industry as well as the feasibility that their companies can 
capture that value before committing to the new technology for the long haul.  The 
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technology when it comes out, disrupting their production processes.  They are not 
as loyal or committed to the status quo as the Early Majority (Moore, 1999). 
As a technology crosses the Chasm, it has exploited most of the technology 
visionaries in the market and notably has trouble attracting new customers.  The 
Pragmatists are not yet comfortable committing to the new technology because 
there aren’t enough trusted references within their peer group recommending the 
new technology (Moore, 1999).  The challenge for the technology is to find a way to 
break into the Early Majority and cross the Valley of Death (VoD). 
A technology faces several possible outcomes while it loiters in the VoD.  The 
technology may cross the VoD and continue on a self-sustaining path toward 
diffusion; technology diffusion may stall after only exhibiting partial diffusion within 
the industry (in other words, the industry could continue to maintain dual 
technologies); or finally, the industry might de-adopt the technology if the Early 
Market alone is insufficient to support the new technology.  Considering this, any 
model of technology diffusion must be consistent with at least four diffusion patterns: 
no adoption, partial adoption, complete adoption and partial adoption/de-adoption. 
The Technology Adoption Chasm in the Department of Defense 
To better understand DoD’s Technology Adoption Chasm, it helps to first 
understand its defense acquisition policies and procedures.  There are three 
decision-making systems within the DoD acquisition process: the requirements 
process embodied in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS); the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process; 
and the Defense Acquisition System.  The Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) is the DoD process for defining DoD’s acquisition 
requirements.  Authority for the JCIDS process resides within the Joint Chiefs of 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 8 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
The primary objective of the JCIDS process is to ensure the joint war-fighter 
receives the capabilities required to successfully execute the missions 
assigned to them. [...] The requirements process supports the acquisition 
process by providing validated capabilities and associated performance 
criteria to be used as a basis for acquiring the right weapon systems.  (US 
CJCS, 2007, p. 2)   
It replaces the pre-existing service-specific requirements-identification processes to 
reduce redundancies and gaps that might persist in a more decentralized system. 
The PPBE process matches resources (money) with requirements, under the 
guidance and direction of several defense documents, including the National 
Security Strategy.  This budget management process involves three years’ budgets 
at any one time: it executes the current year’s budget; it reviews and approves next 
year’s budget, and it formulates the following year’s budget for submission.  The 
commands (the warfighters or the end-users) submit budget requests based on their 
needs.  These requests are reviewed, modified and approved up through the military 
chain of command, to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Congress, and 
finally the President.  The decision-making chain tries to predict what will be needed 
two to three years out and to balance priorities across all end-users. 
The Defense Acquisition System is the management process by which the 
military buys weapons and information systems for the Department of Defense.  The 
Defense Acquisition System’s mission is to “manage the nation’s investment in 
technology, programs, and product support necessary to achieve the National 
Security Strategy and support the United States Armed Forces” (DAU, 2004, p. 1).  
Its objective is to “acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable 
improvements to mission capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and 
at a fair and reasonable price” (DAU, 2004).   
The Defense Acquisition System is primarily governed by DoD Directive 
(DoDD) 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System—which articulates the policies and 
principles that govern the acquisition system, and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2, 
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framework that executes the policies and principles in DoDD 5000.1.  The 
management framework tracks an acquisition program through its significant 
milestones (as the program proceeds from inception to the end of its lifecycle, each 
phase has its own reporting requirements (DAU, 2004)). 
The traditional JCIDS, PPBE and DoD Acquisition processes are 
comprehensive and thoughtful, looking years into the future.  They are long-term 
acquisition planning tools.  However, DoD has faced increasing timelines to 
transition new technology from conception to utilization as defense technology has 
become more complex (GAO, 2006a; Sullivan, 2005).  With technology evolving at a 
rapid rate, our ability to transition mature or emerging technologies to the operational 
forces is hampered by our inability to quickly plan, program and execute funds to 
meet rapidly changing requirements (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (AS&C), 2004b). 
Programmatic flexibility is critically important to technologically intensive 
programs, such as the ACTD/JCTD program.  This program matches significant 
military needs with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology development 
programs, focusing on joint military applications.  This need is usually provided by 
the operational warfighting community (JCS, CINCs, Service operational 
organizations).  The initial requirements and design reflect current COTS 
technological capabilities, but provisions are included to promote evolutionary 
improvements.  The ACTD/JCTD process integrates mature COTS technologies into 
an innovative military capability, allowing decision-makers to fully understand the 
new operational potential before making an acquisition decision (Office of the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems & Concepts (AS&C), 
2004a). 
The ACTD/JCTD program meets this objective by developing prototypes of 
the proposed technology or capability and providing those prototypes to the 
warfighter for evaluation.  The warfighter develops operational concepts to fully 
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realistic military exercises (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (AS&C), 
2004a). 
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Systems & Concepts) 
(DUSD(AS&C)) has oversight responsibility for the ACTD/JCTD program. He is 
responsible for developing and issuing guidance regarding the ACTD/JCTD 
program, for evaluating candidates and approving new ACTDs/JCTDs.  In addition, 
every ACTD/JCTD requires active participation of a sponsor or user organization 
(COCOM or warfighter), in partnership with a service sponsor serving as the 
technical development manager (Defense Acquisition University, 2006)  This creates 
a triad of critical stakeholders: DUSD(AS&C) oversees the early development 
process; the service sponsor serves as technical manager and ultimately chooses 
whether to field the new technology; the COCOMS or warfighters provide input to 
the development process and are the ultimate system users. 
When an ACTD/JCTD is approved, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(AS&C) also approves the associated development funding, including any 
supplemental funding provided by the OSD.  The Technical Manager (TM) from the 
sponsoring lead service executes these funds (Mol, 1998).  The lead service must 
obtain funding for the subsequent ACTD/JCTD acquisition through the Planning 
Program and Budgeting System (PPBS), as with traditional acquisition programs. 
While traditional acquisition programs are fully funded in the Future Years 
Defense Plan (FYDP), ACTD/JCTD programs are not required to include funding in 
the FYDP for post-ACTD/JCTD activity (development, full-rate production, or 
purchase of additional quantities of commercial items) until the ACTD demonstrates 
its military utility (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (AS&C), 2004b).  
At first glance, excluding additional research and development (R&D) or acquisition 
funding from the FYDP may appeal to the Services and the OSD in a fiscally 
constrained environment.  However, it creates problems as ACTD/JCTD 
technologies transition to acquisition programs; they must compete for scarce 
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The lack of programmed funding creates a significant challenge that must be 
addressed during the transition effort. 
As a result, innovative defense technologies crossing the Technology 
Adoption Chasm face several technology adoption challenges that require 
coordination across a complex set of stakeholders.  The decision-maker choosing 
new technologies in which to invest, the service sponsor actually purchasing the 
technology and the technology’s end-user are typically different stakeholders in the 
defense sector, as pictured in Figure 3 below.  The decision-maker/buyer/end-user 
chain is more decentralized in the public sector than is typical in the private sector.  
While the goal of crossing the chasm is the same for these two sectors—placing the 
new technology on a self-propagating path towards total diffusion across the 
defense department—the momentum for getting technology to the end-users is more 
typically catalyzed by a push from the department leaders and technology 
enthusiasts.  Successfully crossing the DoD Adoption Chasm requires aligning the 
incentives for all stakeholders and to specifically engage the end-users so that they 











Figure 3. DoD Technology Adoption Stakeholders 
To better understand the defense technology adoption problem, with 
particular emphasis on ACTD/JCTD program, this research will examine the 
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ACTD/JCTD projects.  The results of this literature review and empirical DoD 
experience will be used to develop a technology adoption model that is consistent 
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Literature Review 
There is an extensive body of academic literature addressing innovation and 
technology transfer.  (For a general discussion see Rogers, 1995.)  This literature 
can be grouped across several dimensions: by industry focus (e.g., agriculture, 
health care, organizational, information technology, meta-analysis, etc.), locus of 
interest (individual adopter characteristics, technology characteristics, industry 
characteristics, adoption environment, information dissemination mechanism, etc.), 
methodology/analytical approach (econometric, survey/questionnaire, cost/benefit 
analysis, case study, etc.), type of innovation (administrative versus technical, 
incremental versus radical, etc.) and stage of the technology transfer process 
(innovators, early adopters, early majority, etc.). 
Our literature survey included studies covering all dimensions of this 
spectrum.  In addition, we specifically included studies that addressed technology 
adoption and de-adoption, as there is ample evidence of both in DoD.  The goal is to 
identify factors that significantly affect technology diffusion—more specifically, 
factors that are relevant to DoD’s experience.  The ultimate goal is to develop a 
technology diffusion model that can replicate the technology transition patterns 
experienced in DoD.  More specifically, we are interested in a defense technology 
adoption model that captures technology transition factors that can be influenced by 
DoD policy.   (See Appendix A for a summary of the technology, locus of interest, 
methodology and significant/insignificant variables of these studies; the meta-
analyses are not included in the literature review. See Appendix 2 for a summary of 
the articles surveyed for this research; bolded items are discussed in more detail 
below.) 
Four case studies are examined more closely below (those in bold-faced type 
above), each highlighting the critical issues found to affect end-user adoption.  
CASE is computer-aided software engineering that was introduced in the late 1980s 
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health care management technology that met resistance in its diffusion.  Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) is an on-going case of adoption that runs somewhat 
parallel to DoD’s RFID adoption.  Finally, the classic case of the QWERTY keyboard 
illustrates several of the critical end-user issues discovered in this analysis.1 
Computer-aided Software Engineering (CASE) 
Computer-aided software engineering (CASE) was expected to improve 
productivity by automating the lifecycle processes of the computer software that 
companies uses to run their businesses.  A Management Information Systems (MIS) 
organization that was adopting CASE agreed to participate in a study of its 
effectiveness.  The company had 100,000 employees and $9 billion in annual sales 
at the time (circa 1989).  Its payroll included around 280 professional employees, 
and it funded a $12 million development budget.  CASE implementation was 
considered a failure, and Norman, Corbitt, Butler and McElroy (1989) investigated 
why.  
Typically, a company’s software engineers improve their own systems—
making this an interesting technology adoption case.  CASE would replace the 
people that managed the company’s internal software.  In other words, these 
software engineers would have to adopt a technology that encroached on their 
territory of systems improvement, potentially making their engineering skills 
obsolete.  The implementation was problematic because the software engineers at 
the MIS organization could not see the benefits of adopting the technology. 
The software engineers needed to clearly see the benefits of this technology 
to reconcile themselves to adopting it.  The technology would free the engineers 
from mundane computing tasks, allowing them to focus on larger, more critical 
problems.  The engineers’ willingness to adopt CASE was limited because they 
didn’t see the potential for using their skills in more creative/constructive, less 
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mundane ways; instead, they saw the technology as removing some of their 
autonomy and control (giving it to the CASE technology).  The software engineers 
didn’t recognize that their company needed this technological innovation to remain 
viable; they, therefore, resisted the adoption. 
In addition, there was the noticeable absence of both a CASE technology 
champion and management commitment in the MIS organization.  These 
deficiencies were cited critical factors in its failure to diffuse throughout the 
organization.  The software engineers did not have a highly visible and well-
respected advocate for the controversial technology they were being asked to 
implement; as a result, they questioned management’s commitment (Norman et al., 
1989). 
Thus, CASE’s failure to diffuse reflects the users’ (software engineers’) 
inability to see the technology’s benefits, their fear of losing control to CASE, their 
lack of situational awareness regarding industry pressures and how CASE could 
help the company’s profitability, their perception that management was not 
committed to the adoption and the distinct absence of a technology champion or 
management commitment for CASE. 
Health Technology Assessments (HTA) 
Health Technology Assessments help “improve decision-making about the 
diffusion and use of health technology” (Drummond & Weatherly, 2000, p. 1).  They 
involve an iterative process that uses “synthesis and implementation” as a critical 
step in the Technology Assessment Iterative Loop (TAIL). This Loop seeks to exploit 
technology to improve medical practice, including reducing inappropriate or 
inefficient treatment (Drummond & Weatherly, 2000).  HTAs have contributed 
significantly to this loop of technology improvement (the TAIL) by developing 
methods to assess efficacy and efficiency of health technologies.  They synthesize 
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& Weatherly, 2000).  However, there is concern that the diffusion of HTAs is slower 
than optimal. 
Health Technology Assessments (HTA) provide an interesting case study into 
the factors that affect technology diffusion, especially considering the organizational 
parallels between the medical field and the Department of Defense.  Health care 
policy-makers are roughly equivalent to those in the military services that decide to 
spend money on certain technologies; the health care researchers are roughly 
equivalent to the military scientists and engineers who develop and/or refine new 
technologies to improve operational performance; the medical clinicians are roughly 
equivalent to the military warfighters—the ultimate technology end-users.  As a 
result, the stakeholders in medical technology diffusion face the same sometimes 
misaligned incentives that affect stakeholders in DoD’s technology diffusion 
environment. 
In health care, the policy-makers’ careers are evaluated on their ability to 
make expedient policy decisions with sometimes insufficient information; 
researchers are professionally rewarded by publishing their work in reputable 
journals or securing research funding; clinicians, or practitioners, are the 
stakeholders that ultimately choose to adopt new practices or use new technologies.  
Practitioners tend to be risk-averse and resist change until uncertainties are fully 
resolved.  The incentives for each stakeholder group reflect those actions on which 
its members are ultimately evaluated (either formally or informally by their peers, 
colleagues or patients).  The reward systems of these opposing careers can lead to 
different decisions regarding HTA implementation because their incentives are not 
aligned.   
The diffusion of HTAs was further resisted at the clinical level due to issues 
involving control.  Clinicians will resist adopting HTA innovations if they perceive a 
conflict between clinic autonomy and compliance with policies mandated from 
outside the clinic.  The clinicians want to control their practices and procedures, 
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medical practice may be hindered by concern over potential loss of autonomy at the 
operational level and by the misaligned incentives among stakeholders (Drummond 
& Weatherly, 2000). 
The QWERTY Keyboard 
Perhaps the most infamous story of a market failing to adopt a superior 
technology is the story of how the QWERTY keyboard emerged as the industry 
standard, even though it is widely recognized as an inferior keyboard configuration.  
In fact, economic analysis completed in the 1940s proved that the increased 
efficiency of switching to a properly arranged keyboard would overcome the 
necessary retraining costs within 10 days (David, 1986).  How did an inefficient 
technology become the industry standard?  The QWERTY case study demonstrates 
the critical importance of network externalities in driving or deterring technology 
adoption and diffusion. Positive network externalities exist whenever the value of 
adopting a particular technology increases as the number of other adopters of that 
particular technology increases.  Network externalities can be classified as either 
indirect or direct, and Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of each variety. 
  
  Direct Network Externalities Indirect Network Externalities 
 More users adopt 
the technology 
Users value the 
technology more 
New users adopt 
the technology 
More users adopt 
the technology 
Users value the 
technology more 





Figure 4. Direct vs. Indirect Network Externalities 
The classic example of direct network externalities is a telephone network.  
The value of a telephone network to the first person connected is essentially zero, 
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value increases for all adopters as more individuals are connected to the network. 
The telephone example is considered a direct network externality because adopter 
value increases as a direct result of other adopters becoming members of the 
network.  Direct network externalities are sometimes referred to as first-order 
network externalities. 
In some situations, however, there are indirect network externalities in which 
adopter value does not depend directly upon the number of other adopters, but 
instead increases due to the responses of “complementors” or other players who are 
influenced by the number of buyers in the network.  The classic example of indirect 
network externalities is the hardware-software relationship in personal computers, 
video games, or similar technologies: While the value of a particular hardware 
platform (Macintosh vs. PC, PlayStation vs. Xbox, etc.) in these environments may 
not depend directly on the number of adopters of that platform, it does depend on 
the variety of compatible software (applications, games, etc.) that is available for that 
platform, which turn is directly related to the size of the installed base of users of that 
platform. Thus, adopter value is indirectly related to the number of other adopters of 
each competing technology. Such indirect network externalities are also referred to 
as second-order network externalities, installed base effects or system compatibility 
effects. 
In the competition among typewriter keyboard layouts, the “standards war” 
was characterized by both direct and indirect network externalities. There was a 
direct network externality in that users of typewriters wanted to be familiar with 
whichever keyboard layout was most prevalent, so that their typing skills would be 
transferrable across typewriters, jobs, locations, and so on. Similarly, businesses 
wanted to adopt typewriters with whichever keyboard layout was the most common, 
so that potential employees familiar with that particular layout would be abundant. 
There was also an indirect network externality present, in that markets for goods and 
services which complemented specific keyboard layouts developed.  For example, 
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QWERTY typing schools and classes, supporting manuals and handbooks, and 
QWERTY-based speed-typing competitions (David, 1986). 
The QWERTY key arrangement dates back to the 1870s and stems from the 
age of typewriters—when the keys were purposefully arranged to slow typists down 
and prevent the typebars (the arms holding the letter stamps) from physically 
jamming inside the machine.  The keys on the center row of the QWERTY keyboard 
are only used 51% of the time, making the finger activity of the QWERTY typist 
relatively inefficient.  In contrast, the British-developed keyboard arrangement placed 
91% of the most frequently used English language letters in the center row (David, 
1986). 
By the 1870s, typewriter engineering improvements had rendered obsolete 
the QWERTY keyboard arrangement justifications.  In the ensuing typewriter boom 
of the 1880s, businesses eager to capture market share produced competing 
typewriter versions with alternative key arrangements.  By 1896, the US typewriter 
market seemed to be selecting the QWERTY keyboard as the industry standard due 
to the widely distributed QWERTY models from Sholes-Remington and James 
Bartlett Hammond. 
Essentially, the QWERTY keyboard was initially “superior” in the sense that it 
reduced the occurrence of typewriter jams, thus promulgating this keyboard 
arrangement as the dominant standard.  Eventually, however, the issue of typewriter 
jams became less important and the QWERTY keyboard became an inferior 
standard by the now more-important measure of typing speed and efficiency. By that 
time, however, the strong direct and indirect network externalities resulting from the 
large installed-base of QWERTY keyboards insured that this inferior arrangement 
would remain the dominant standard. 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
Passive Radio Frequency Identification (pRFID) has incredible potential to 
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is an ongoing process, RFID technology provides a good lens through which to 
discuss indirect network externalities.  It also illustrates the importance of a 
respected technology champion when coordination is required across technology 
adoption stakeholders.  This case study examines Wal-Mart’s civilian-market RFID 
technology-adoption initiatives. 
Wal-Mart initiated an aggressive RFID adoption strategy in 2005, involving 
the company’s own infrastructure, its top 100 suppliers and a timeline for RFID 
manufacturers.  Wal-Mart’s widely publicized implementation plan served as a 
coordinating mechanism for other retail businesses.  Other firms, including Target, 
could leverage Wal-Mart’s bold move to capture the perceived benefits associated 
with early adoption (Dew & Read, 2007; McWilliams, 2007). 
Like the QWERTY keyboard, RFID is a technology characterized by network 
externalities: its value for each individual user increases with the installed user base.  
In order to improve performance (product visibility) throughout the network (the 
supply chain, in this case), as many participants in the network as possible must 
adopt the technology (RFID). There is an extensive set of complementary hardware 
and software tools required to exploit RFID in managing the supply chain: retailers 
must imbed saleable products with pRFID tags; hardware is required to read the 
integrated tags along the supply chain; and middleware or software is needed to 
track and process the data collected. 
These required complementary hardware and software tools (including 
humanware—the change of policies and practices) introduce an indirect network 
externality into the RFID technology adoption process.  At the extreme, the indirect 
network externality takes on the properties of a “weakest link” scenario: The network 
is only as strong as its weakest link. Without the readers, RFID technology is 
useless; without the software to process the collected data, the technology is 
useless; if Wal-Mart employees don’t change their policies and practices to exploit 
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complementary developments and participation by all stakeholders throughout the 
supply chain to maintain product visibility across the supply chain. 
Once readers, middleware and procedures are in place, the incremental or 
variable costs of the passive RFID tags themselves is relatively manageable.  The 
potential gain from real-time information about the status of the supply chain is 
significant.  For example, the ability to react quickly to demand changes for faddish 
merchandise or seasonal items can significantly reduce Wal-Mart’s costs and 
improve its bottom line. 
Wal-Mart has leveraged its position as a market leader to coordinate private-
sector RFID adoption.  Sam Walton’s involvement provided a clear management 
commitment within Wal-Mart; indeed, he can be considered the reputable and highly 
visible RFID technology champion within the retail industry.  His involvement 
(through the industry giant he represents) has championed RFID technology and 
hastened its adoption both within his empire and among his various merchandise 
suppliers. 
To indicate its support for RFID technology, Wal-Mart invited its 100 top 
suppliers to an RFID conference where it mandated that they would implement RFID 
technology and its infrastructure if they wanted to continue business relations with 
Wal-Mart.  Not only did Wal-Mart’s top suppliers comply with the industry giant’s 
mandate, but 46 additional firms coordinated their adoption of RFID around Wal-
Mart’s move (Dew & Read, 2007).   
Wal-Mart also established an aggressive timeline for producing RFID tags 
and installing reader equipment.  This gave RFID tag manufacturers a reliable 
production schedule.  These efforts to coordinate RFID technology adoption in the 
retail market hastened the diffusion process and made this particular pRFID 
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RFID implementation in supply-chain management illustrates the effects of 
indirect network externalities as well as the influence of a powerful technology 
champion on the adoption process.  Without the complementary products, users 
can’t realize the benefits of the new technology.  Technology champions, when 
highly respected and suitably visible, can hasten adoption.   
Recurring Themes 
This research identifies several recurring themes as critically affecting the 
success of the adoption.  We have focused on those themes that are most relevant 
to the Department of Defense and most likely affected by changes in defense 
acquisitions policies and procedures.  Recall that the relevant issues for the 
Department of Defense include coordinating technology adoption across a complex 
set of decentralized stakeholders, including the decision-maker/buyer/end-user, to 
align their incentives and specifically engaging the end-users to “pull” the new 
technology over the chasm. 
Benefit/cost Uncertainty 
If the end-users are uncertain about the technology’s costs and benefits, they 
will be reluctant to adopt the new technology.  Early in the adoption process, users 
are typically uncertain about the innovation’s technical performance, cost and 
diffusion potential.  Technical performance affects the innovation’s expected 
benefits; cost uncertainty affects the innovation’s expected cost, and diffusion 
potential affects the innovation’s long-term viability.  End-users will become more 
comfortable as other similar users (an appropriate reference group) adopt the 
technology and accumulate relevant experience.  To some extent, this theme is 
consistent across all of the case studies highlighted above. 
Control 
An organization increasing efficiency through centralization and 
standardization often does so at the expense of the individual end-users’ control and 
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procurement, training, support costs and maintenance.  The total benefits may 
exceed the total costs for a new innovation, but the end-users often experience 
costs that exceed their personal benefits because the benefits are siphoned off by 
the centralized organization.  If end-users lose control over their 
operations/decisions by adopting a new technology and don’t recognize any 
significant benefits in return, they resist adopting that technology.  Concern over 
losing control was evident in both the CASE and HTA examples described above.  
With CASE, the engineers that managed the company’s internal software were 
concerned about losing autonomy over this process; with HTA, clinicians were 
concerned that relying on HTAs to improve medical practice would reduce their 
autonomy in treating their patients.  Successful technology adoption requires 
thorough demonstration that the benefits from the new technology exceed any 
drawbacks from its adoption. 
Misaligned Incentives 
Decision-making within large organizations is frequently compromised by 
misaligned incentives: individual decision-makers face different incentives and 
frequently hold goals and objectives divergent from the larger organization.  
Misaligned organizational incentives are often referred to as the principal-agent 
problem; generally speaking, individual decision-makers don’t directly face the same 
mission and pressures as the broader organization.  The organization’s total benefits 
from adopting a new technology might exceed the organization’s total costs; 
however, misaligned incentives could inhibit the end-user from making the 
organizationally optimal decision when he/she is acting as the decision-maker.  Both 
the CASE and HTAs programs were inhibited by misaligned incentives.  RFID would 
likely be a similar example if the Wal-Mart had not mandated the change; it would 
not be in the self-interest of the individual decision-makers to independently adopt 
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Management Commitment 
If the end-user within an organization is confident that management is 
committed to the new technology, the end-user will be more willing to adopt the 
technology.  Management commitment will reduce the perceived risks of the 
benefit/cost uncertainties end-users face when adopting new technologies and will 
counteract misaligned incentives.  End-users will be more likely to accept those risks 
if management explicitly endorses the new technology.  Wal-Mart’s management 
commitment was evident in the RFID case; more explicit management commitment 
might have facilitated technology adoption for CASE and HTA technologies. 
Technology Champion 
As management commitment is necessary for complete adoption of a new 
technology, the end-user will be less hesitant to commit to a new technology if there 
is a respected and visible technology champion—even when the champion is 
external to the decision-makers’ organization.  With a strong technology champion, 
other end-users are more likely to adopt the innovation, helping to push the 
technology across the Technology Adoption Chasm.  For example, Target and other 
commercial firms are more likely to adopt RFID technology if they perceive that Wal-
Mart is committed to championing the technology.  A technology champion can 
serve as a self-referencing peer group in attracting Early Adopters and in assisting 
technology to cross the chasm. 
Direct and Indirect Network Externalities 
Finally, if the benefit from adopting a technology depends – either directly or 
indirectly – on the number of other adopters of that technology, potential adopters 
will be hesitant until a sufficiently large overall network or user-base is well assured.  
This was particularly evident in both the RFID and QWERTY keyboard cases above.  
With RFID, Wal-Mart’s size and decision to commit to early adoption will help 
establish the network for pRFID.  Similarly, the extensive installed base of QWERTY 
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Application to DoD Technology Adoption 
Drawing on the discussion above, the question of whether end-user benefits 
exceed end-user costs for a new technology can be complicated if either the true 
benefits or costs aren’t well known in advance or if all benefits and costs don’t 
accrue to the end-user.  Of particular interest in defense technology transfer, the 
literature review has identified at least two general circumstances in which end-
users’ decisions might be distorted: (1) in the presence of end-user cost and benefit 
uncertainty, and (2) when some costs and/or benefits accrue to others beyond the 
technology adoption decision-maker (when there are external costs and/or benefits).   
Benefit/Cost Uncertainty 
One factor affecting technology diffusion is uncertainty about the costs and 
benefits of a new technology.  In general, the benefit-cost comparison will be most 
favorable for higher-valued users, so we would expect higher-valued users to be 
among the early adopters of a new technology.  Benefit-cost comparisons will be 
less attractive for medium- and lower-valued users, so we would expect them to 
adopt later in the adoption lifecycle, if at all.  When costs and benefits are poorly 
defined, users may have trouble identifying if they are high-, medium- or low-value 
users.  This might lead to some false starts, with partial adoptions followed by de-
adoption, as some users find they were inappropriately optimistic about the 
technology’s net benefits. 
Externalities 
Many technologies hoping to “cross the chasm” also experience different 
externalities.  An externality is a consequence of an economic decision that imposes 
a side-effect on others that is not considered by the decision-makers.  In technology 
adoption, externalities occur when the decision-maker does not bear all of the costs 
associated with technology adoption or capture all of the associated benefits.  Two 
externalities seem particularly relevant to this research: organizational externalities 
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An organizational externality occurs when some adoption costs and/or 
benefits are absorbed or felt by the greater organization that has implemented the 
economic decision; these are not directly born by the end-user/decision-maker.  A 
network externality, on the other hand, occurs when the value of the item increases 
for each individual user as the size of the user-base increases (Katz & Shapiro; 
1986; Shy, 2001). 
As we have seen, network externalities can be direct or indirect.  For direct 
network externalities, the value of the item for each user depends directly on the size 
of the user base.  Indirect network externalities occur when the value of the item for 
each user depends on the available complementary goods.  The VCR is another 
example of a technology exhibiting indirect network externalities.  In the 1980s, the 
Beta and VHS VCRs were competing to be the standard video tape format.  As the 
number of VHS players increased, the set of complementary goods available for the 
VHS VCR also increased (namely, the number of VHS-format tapes), raising the 
value of the VHS VCR.  This arguably contributed to the eventual success of VHS 
over the allegedly superior Beta format. 
In general, the literature themes align well with the application to the defense 
technology adoption issues identified above, as pictured in Figure 5 below.  Clearly, 
benefit/cost uncertainty is common to both lists.  Control, misaligned incentives, and 
management commitment are essentially manifestations of organizational 
externalities.  They involve situations in which stakeholders within the organization 
fail to consider all of the cost and/or benefits associated with their technology 
adoption decisions; the costs and/or benefits they fail to consider accrue to the 
organization, as opposed to the individual end-user/decision-maker.  Technology 
champion and complementary goods are more closely related to network 
externalities.  They represent situations in which the benefits of technology adoption 
depend at least partially on adoption decisions made by others.  The literature 
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and network externality as reoccurring issues for technologies as they attempt to 
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Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
(ACTD)/Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 
(JCTD) Case Studies 
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program, which 
evolved into the Joint Capability Technology demonstration (JCTD) program, 
exploits commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology that has potential applications 
to joint military operations.  The ACTD/JCTD process takes a nominal 2-4 years and 
involves three players (see Figure 6): the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-
funded scientists and engineers who develop and demonstrate the technology, the 
service sponsors who buy and support the technology and the Combatant 
Commands (COCOMS) and warfighters who use the technology.  In this process, 
OSD funds the scientists and engineers to refine the COTS technology for the joint 
military operations.  After a successful Military Utility Assessment (MUA) that 
demonstrates the technology would benefit the joint warfighter in the field, the OSD 
tries to enlist a service sponsor to finance the new technology acquisition and 
provide it to the warfighters within the COCOMS.  This hand-off to service sponsors 
is a difficult pairing, because the ACTD/JCTD technologies were not previously in 
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Figure 6. DoD Technology Acquisition Triangle 
The ACTD/JCTD program and these emerging technologies have 
experienced encouraging successes but still face challenges.  A service has to 
sponsor the technology to fund its acquisition and delivery and to sustain it in the 
field.  However, near-term funding resources are typically committed years into the 
future as the services operate within the planning, programming, budgeting and 
execution cycle.  In addition, the successful fielding of these joint technologies 
frequently requires coordination across several stakeholders from multiple military 
services.   
Overview of the Empirical Study 
As a part of this research, we analyzed the predictive value of ACTD 
management plans.  Our research question was “To what extent can ACTD 
transition be predicted by data contained in ACTD management plans?”   We 
analyzed the management plans of 38 ACTDs.  Of these, 19 were programs that 
have not transitioned into the acquisition process; these were matched with a 
sample of 19 programs that are designated as transitioned (the transition to the 
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common variables available in the plans and used multivariate regression to 
examine what factors predict transition and which did not. 
Our results suggest that two variables are significantly correlated with 
transition in this sample: the level at which the budget and schedule match and the 
level of technology maturity.  These variables emerged as quite strong predictors of 
transition.   
This section of the report proceeds as follows.  First, the researchers discuss 
how we selected, coded and analyzed the data.  Second, we discuss the results 
found.  Third, we discuss several interpretations of these results and explain how 
these findings link to and motivate the technology adoption model developed 
through this analysis. 
Selection, Coding and Data Analysis 
ACTDs were first introduced in 1995 with 12 authorized demonstrations.  In 
total, there have been 167 programs approved through FY07.   Of these, 112 have 
completed the demonstration phase (due to the nature of ACTDs, those initiated 
FY06 or later are typically still underway), and 55 are still in process.  Of the 167, 16 
programs have been terminated, and three have been place on hold—making a total 
sample of 19 that have not transitioned.  74 have been placed in the "transitioned on 
record" category (indicating a successful transition into the acquisition process), 
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95 11 11  1 1  9  
96 12 12   2  10  
97 9 9     8 1 
98 14 14  1 2  11  
99 11 11     11  
00 12 11 1 1 2  8  
01 15 15  1 1  6 7 
02 18 15 3 2  1 7 5 
03 14 7 7 1  1 2 3 
04 13 4 9   1 0 3 
05 15 3 12 1   2 0 
06 13 0 13    0 0 
07 10 0 10    0 0 
Total 167 112 55 8 8 3 74 19 
For this study, we included all 19 ACTDs that have not transitioned and 
matched them with a comparison sample of 19 ACTDs that have transitioned.  
ACTDs used for the comparison sample were selected randomly from ACTDs that 
entered the program at approximately the same time as the non-transitioning 
sample.  In principle, though the matched sample size is a little small (19), the 
overall sample size of 38 means that the statistical analysis we performed should 
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Hypothesized Possible Affect 
X 
 
Figure 7. Characterization of Current Data Analysis 
Readers of this report should be aware of potential pitfalls of this study that 
derive from data availability bias.  We capture this in Figure 7 (above).  First, the 
study focused on the relationship between data available in management plans and 
ACTD transition.  Needless to say, this is a small subset of the wide variety of other 
variables that are not expressed in the management plans that might be linked to 
ACTD transition.   
Second, we used our prior knowledge of innovation research to direct the 
data-gathering exercise from the management plans.  We hypothesized certain 
relationships might be important, and we directed our data-collection efforts based 
on these hypotheses.  We believe we hypothesized a reasonable spectrum of 
relationships that draw on a variety of innovation research that crosses disciplinary 
boundaries; i.e., the study is inter-disciplinary (not focused purely on economic 
variables or on organizational variables).  However, other researchers might search 
for and extract different data than we searched and extracted—i.e., search other 
quadrants of Figure 7.  In doing so, they might discover significant relationships that 
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Data coding 
For a full overview of how we coded the data from gathered ACTD 
management plans, see Phelps and Wideman (2007, pp. 53-60).  We coded the 
following variables: 
1. Transition: This was the dependent variable in the study.  We coded it 
as a binary variable, i.e., 0/1. 
2. Manager assignment: ACTD guidelines are not explicit but imply all 
management of individual ACTD programs will be named.  We 
identified seven key roles and counted how many of these were filled 
with a named manager for each ACTD. 
3. Budget Matched to Schedule: We compared the correspondence 
between schedule and forecasted funding for each ACTD and used a 
binary coding (i.e., 0/1) to indicate a reasonable match or an obvious 
mismatch between the development schedule and funding identified in 
the management plan.   
4. Established Military Need: We coded the identification of military needs 
(high/medium/low) depending on the information expressed in the 
management plan.   
5. Technology Maturity: Given the importance of software in almost all 
ACTDs, we used a measure of software maturity as a proxy for overall 
technological maturity.  We rated ACTDs high/medium/low depending 
on the degree of COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) software used.  
6. Transition Strategy: We coded transition strategy high/medium/low 
depending on the degree to which the management plans described a 
transition strategy for a particular ACTD. 
7. Timeline Requirement: We coded the number of years an ACTD was 
in progress based on a review of the development and demonstration 
schedules in management plans (NB: ACTD guidelines suggest that 
programs have a 2-4 schedule).  
8. Management plan depth: We used page count as a proxy for the 
overall comprehensive of the management strategy for an ACTD. 
9. Number of Parties Involved: We coded based on the number of parties 
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10. Capital Investment Requirement: This was the total budgeted dollars 
described in the management plan. 
11. Technology Complexity: We coded this high/medium/low based on 
whether a plan for technical integration was described in the 
management plan. 
12. Risk Assessment: We coded this based on a subjective assessment of 
program risks and the comprehensiveness of risk-mitigation 
procedures included in the management plans.  
Table 2 (below) exhibits the complete codings we used for the empirical 
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Table 2. Raw Data Coding  























































































































































Mountain Top 0 4 0 2 3 1 1 3 2 1 22 70.50 1
MDITDS 0 5 1 3 2 3 1 4 2 3 33 12.35 na
Multi Link 0 3 0 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 14.70 na
Boost Phase 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 0.00 na
CBIS 0 3 0 2 2 3 1 3 2 2 29 0.00 na
Tac Laser 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 0.00 na
JMLS 0 6 1 1 3 2 1 4 1 1 21 25.30 1
Tac UAV 0 2 1 2 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 84.90 na
HLS/HLD 0 3 1 1 3 1 0 3 1 1 20 63.43 na
CIA COP 0 3 1 3 2 3 0 3 2 2 51 29.00 2
Agent Defeat 0 1 0 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 13 12.06 na
TACMS-P 0 4 1 2 3 3 1 3 2 1 31 50.6 1
TASC 0 6 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 2 11 2.85 1
HPM 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 3 0 0 na
Plato 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 na
HAA 0 3 0 1 2 1 0 5 2 3 3 145 na
JEERCE 0 2 0 2 2 2 1 3 3 2 8 14.2 na
IFSAR 0 1 0 2 2 3 0 4 3 3 6 62.3 na
LEWK 0 3 0 3 1 3 0 4 3 3 16 27.95 na
Adv Joint Plan 1 5 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 20 32.8 1
HAE UAV 1 6 1 2 2 3 0 4 2 2 28 935.8 na
Nav War 1 7 1 3 3 3 1 3 2 1 28 59.1 na
SAIP 1 5 1 3 3 3 1 4 3 2 29 119.8 na
Joint Cont Stk 1 3 1 3 2 2 1 5 2 2 29 15.6 na
C4I for CW 1 3 1 3 2 2 0 4 3 2 8 21 na
CAESAR 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 na
JICR 1 4 1 3 2 3 0 4 2 2 26 0.061 2
LOSAT 1 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 2 1 30 176.7 1
WDLN 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 8 31.4 n/a
MANPACK 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 2 18 56.5 2
TSV 1 7 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 25 143.8 1
JBFSA 1 6 1 3 2 3 1 3 2 2 81 39.75 2
LASER 1 3 1 3 2 3 0 3 2 2 37 33.8 2
JDSR 1 7 1 3 2 3 0 10 2 1 61 31.6 2
CASPOD 1 4 1 2 2 3 0 3 2 2 32 43 2
TIPS 1 3 1 2 2 1 0 3 1 1 13 16.7 2
JAC 1 7 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 2 27 12.6 2
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Analysis and Results 
Overall Model Results 
We used linear regression to analyze the data in Table 2.  The full regression 
model is shown below in Table 3.  From this model, we can see that two variables 
are significantly correlated with ACTD transition: Budget matches schedule and 
Technology maturity (with greater than 95% confidence).  A third variable, Risk 
assessment, was marginally significant.  The overall model suggests that 40% of the 
variance in ACTD transition can be explained by variance in the 11 independent 
variables we coded. 
Table 3. Linear Regression Model  









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 11 5.55483 0.50498 3.32802 0.00571
Residual 26 3.94517 0.15174
Total 37 9.5
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.99265 0.63874 1.55407 0.13226 -0.32031 2.30560 -0.32031 2.30560
Budget Matches Schedule 0.72701 0.19680 3.69424 0.00103 0.32249 1.13153 0.32249 1.13153
Technology Maturity -0.38282 0.17502 -2.18728 0.03791 -0.74258 -0.02306 -0.74258 -0.02306
Risk Assessment -0.29174 0.17528 -1.66446 0.10803 -0.65202 0.06855 -0.65202 0.06855
Capital Investment 0.00041 0.00048 0.85332 0.40127 -0.00057 0.00138 -0.00057 0.00138
Transition Strategy 0.06007 0.11339 0.52980 0.60074 -0.17300 0.29315 -0.17300 0.29315
Military Need Established 0.07130 0.13854 0.51464 0.61115 -0.21347 0.35607 -0.21347 0.35607
Page Count (Plan Depth) -0.00289 0.00627 -0.46013 0.64925 -0.01578 0.01001 -0.01578 0.01001
2-4 Year Requirement 0.06853 0.15948 0.42974 0.67092 -0.25928 0.39635 -0.25928 0.39635
Technology Complexity 0.05759 0.14643 0.39328 0.69732 -0.24340 0.35858 -0.24340 0.35858
Total Managers Identified -0.01249 0.05208 -0.23991 0.81228 -0.11954 0.09455 -0.11954 0.09455
Parties Involved 0.01112 0.05353 0.20774 0.83705 -0.09892 0.12116 -0.09892 0.12116  
Variables Significantly Correlated with ACTD Transition 
Based on our analysis in Table 3, we eliminated non-significant variables and 
ran a more parsimonious analysis that only included three variables: Budget 
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linear regression model is shown in Table 4 (below).  This model has an adjusted R2 
of 0.50, indicating that half of the variance in ACTD transition is explained by the 
model.  Again, only two variables are significant with 95% confidence: Budget 
matches schedule and Technology maturity.   
Table 4. Linear Regression Model for Significant Variables Only 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 5.16616 1.72205 13.50994 0.00001
Residual 34 4.33384 0.12747
Total 37 9.5
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 1.17339 0.55039 2.13191 0.04032 0.05486 2.29192 0.05486 2.29192
Budget Matches Schedule 0.77935 0.14193 5.49106 0.00000 0.49091 1.06779 0.49091 1.06779
Technology Maturity -0.36725 0.14892 -2.46604 0.01886 -0.66990 -0.06460 -0.66990 -0.06460
Risk Assessment -0.21433 0.13300 -1.61151 0.11631 -0.48461 0.05596 -0.48461 0.05596  
Correlation between Variables 
In order to understand the non-significance of the Risk-assessment variable, 
we analyzed the correlation between independent variables.  Table 5 (below) 
presents these relationships, with the key relationships highlighted in green.   
The most important point to note from Table 5 is the positive and strong 
correlation between Technology maturity and Risk assessment.  This analysis, 
together with the non-significance of Risk assessment (at the 95% confidence level) 
in the analyses presented in Tables 3 and 4, suggests Risk assessment is strongly 
related to technology transition; reducing risk could prove beneficial to technologies 
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Table 5. Correlation between Significant Variables 




























Total Managers Identified 1
Budget Matches Schedule 0.55817 1
Military Need Established 0.43561 0.43503 1
Technology Maturity 0.32664 0.41750 -0.03499 1
Transition Strategy 0.34858 0.29011 0.66989 -0.05051 1
2-4 Year Requirement 0.07191 -0.04942 -0.20404 0.35085 -0.19280 1
Parties Involved 0.54582 0.32021 0.44129 0.05774 0.39214 -0.26816 1
Technology Complexity -0.08823 -0.31208 0.25035 -0.52671 0.17046 -0.13318 0.01922 1
Risk Assessment -0.35662 0.47130 -0.02527 0.77122 0.07443 -0.24736 -0.10886 0.67607 1
Page Count (Plan Depth) 0.59889 0.49521 0.63518 0.09658 0.65794 -0.12157 0.46631 -0.07085 -0.21105 1
Capital Investment 0.26217 0.16029 0.02544 0.04517 0.18892 -0.20567 0.13642 -0.01376 -0.03373 0.09782 1  
Interpreting the Results and Linking Them to the Rest of the 
Study  
In this section of the report, we attempt to move from the empirical results we 
found to a proposed underlying conceptual model that captures the ACTD transition 
(or non-transition) phenomenon.  We have endeavored to capture the key points in 
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Figure 8. ACTD Management Plan/Transition Model 
 
The suggestion we make in Figure 8 is that the variables we measured in our 
empirical study are proxies for four underlying factors: 
1. Information completeness: A key question in all ACTDs is “Will the 
technology work?” The more complete the answer to this question, the 
more likely that an ACTD will transition successfully.  More complete 
answers are possible when there is more information available about 
the technology; i.e., data that shows it works.  In the empirical study, 
we used three proxies to measure this variable: technology maturity, 
project risk and technology complexity.  Of these measures, 
technology maturity turned out to be the significant metric.  The 
intuition here is that more mature technologies are information rich and  
there is less risk in that information because the technology has been 
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2. Organizational commitment: Another important question for ACTD 
transition is “Are there DoD entities that are committed to funding it?”  
We captured the funding concept in our measure budget matches 
schedule, which was significantly correlated with transition.  The 
principle underlying this part of the model is that funding commitments 
are “where the rubber hits the road.”  The ability to prioritize needed 
funding for an ACTD is one of the prime indicators of DoD entities 
having a serious commitment to an ACTD.  Such commitments can be 
contrasted to “cheap talk” about technologies that ultimately fail to 
attract funding. 
3. Distal payoffs: The concept of distal payoffs refers to the ultimate 
anticipated future payoffs from transitioning a technology.  In principle, 
this might be calculated by using NPV analysis, payback analysis, etc.  
In our empirical analysis, we used two proxies to capture the 
importance of this concept: demonstrable military need and capital 
investment.  These ought, in theory, to be highly correlated with 
payoffs.  Both turned out to be non-significant.  We will discuss why 
this might be the case in the next section of the paper. 
4. Organizational processes: This variable represents the underlying 
organizational/bureaucratic processes involved in the administration of 
the ACTD program.  The management plans we coded contained 
several measures that might be proxies for these processes, including 
the identification of key staffers, the depth of management plans, the 
detail of the transition strategy, the number of organizational parties 
involved, and whether the technology met the 2-4 year timeline criteria 
for ACTDs.  None of these measures were significantly correlated with 
ACTD transition. 
Overall, the proxies for information completeness and organizational 
commitment were found to be significant, strong predictors of transition.  Proxies for 
distal payoffs and organizational processes were found to be insignificant.  This 
suggests that our model can be refined down to two questions that are key 
predictors of ACTD transition: 
1. “Will the technology work?” and  
2. “Are there DoD entities that are committed to funding it?” 
Why are these the important questions in ACTD transition?  One 
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program is processing technologies, and the primary goal of the program—and its 
benchmark for success—is getting technologies “out of the door” (i.e., successfully 
transitioned).  Individual management roles are aligned to these organizational 
imperatives.  What are the key factors that enable technologies to be pushed out the 
door?  Not surprisingly, technologies that have the commitment of one or more DoD 
entities (that are, therefore, willing to “put their money where their mouth is”) and that 
have relatively full information about their performance (and, therefore, are relatively 
certain prospects when fielded into an operational setting) are prime candidates for 
transition.  If we consider the ACTD office as an organization that manages this 
pipeline of technologies, and consider its narrow set of goals for moving 
technologies that come into the program back out again (the processing approach 
we alluded to earlier), then the importance of these two variables make intuitive 
sense.  They can be thought of as two hurdles that every ACTD program has to be 
able to get over; programs that don’t pass these two tests are very significantly less 
likely to transition, regardless of other variables that might be cited in their favor. 
Connecting our Findings on ACTD Transition to Research on 
Innovation  
The findings we have so far presented make even more sense when they are 
considered in the context of the very rich empirical and conceptual research on 
innovation which has become a mainstay of academics over the past 50 years.  
There are several deep issues that are manifest in the ACTD management process 
that are worth some careful reflection. 
Why Are Distal Payoffs Non-significant? 
Historically, there has been a long-running debate among economists on the 
importance of demand-side and supply-side factors in innovation dynamics (Geroski, 
2003).  Demand-siders argue that the progress of innovation depends, like 
everything else in economics, on the payoffs to innovation.  This means that 
entrepreneurial perceptions about emerging customer demands and judgments 
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and subsequently brought to the market.  Supply-siders have argued decisively that 
however much economists might like to think that this is true; this perspective is 
simply not borne out by empirical research on innovation (Mowery & Rosenberg, 
1979).  Instead, they have argued that supply-push factors best explain patterns of 
evolution in technology systems.   
The supply-side arguments have largely won the day in the empirical 
innovation literature (Geroski, 2003).  Understanding this trend helps explain why 
distal payoffs are non-significant in our ACTD analysis.  The crux of supply-siders’ 
argument is that there is so much uncertainty about which innovations might be 
successful in the marketplace that (discounted) payoffs are poor predictors of the 
direction of innovation (Rosenberg, 1996).  Uncertainty manifests itself in a wide 
variety of ways and is crucial for understanding how innovation processes work.  As 
a result, payoffs are too distal to make much difference in decisions that need to be 
made today about which innovations to pursue.  This is consistent with our literature 
survey findings—that benefit-cost uncertainty is a critical factor in the technology-
adoption process. 
How is this explanation reflected in our ACTD data?  First, we must consider 
capital investment, which was a non-significant predictor of transition.  Investment is 
a crucial driver of net present value, so if ACTDs were transitioned based on 
payoffs, intuition says that capital investment ought to be significant.  However, there 
are a great many uncertainties about the eventual amount of capital a technology 
will need to bring it to fruition.  Ample evidence exists on cost overruns, which are 
endemic in innovations.  Second, we must consider demonstrable military need.  
DoD faces further uncertainties in estimating the financial value of new technologies 
because of the difficulty of translating military effectiveness into measures of 
financial value.  Moreover, it is extremely difficult to predict the eventual timing of 
military use of an innovation; misestimating the timing of cash flows severely 
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In sum, the non-significance of distal payoffs in ACTD transition makes 
perfect sense in light of the research literature on innovation and is consistent with 
our previous findings. 
Why is Organizational Commitment Significant? 
The significant result for our proxy of organizational commitment may be 
connected to the insignificant results we found for distal payoffs.  The “budget 
matched schedule” variable suggests that programs are significantly more likely to 
transition if they generate funding to match program scheduling.  This finding points 
to the omnipresent status of an ACTD program’s budget for its ultimate success or 
failure.  The proper alignment between a program’s schedule and its funding is so 
essential that aligning schedule and funding can signal organizational commitment 
to a progressing technology.  
Given that we have already ruled out distal technology payoffs to predicting 
which technologies DoD entities will commit funding, then what does predict the 
pattern of commitments?  One hypothesis maintains that this is a matter of 
organizational politics (Allison & Zellikow, 1999).  In the absence of economic 
certainties (payoffs), politicking takes over.  In this view, organizational commitments 
(reflected in funding for some programs, but not others) emerges from a complex 
process of internal politicking between key organizational actors.  What matters for a 
project is that some powerful individual applies his/her personal influence to secure 
discretionary funding for a new technology.  In this sense, the proper alignment of 
the budget and schedule is a proxy for management commitment within the lead 
service and for a technology champion by others outside the lead service—both 
identified as critical factors in the earlier literature survey. 
Why are Informational Factors Significant? 
Our empirical results indicate that a significant and strong correlation exists 
between technology maturity and ACTD transition.  Maturity is, in large part, driven 
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technologies.  One interpretation of this result is that it reflects the important role that 
information about the technology’s performance plays in influencing its transition 
(consistent with the role of benefit-cost uncertainty in the literature survey).  Of 
course, there is much more information available about a pre-existing (COTS) 
technology than about one that is currently under development.  Moreover, risk 
assessment was highly correlated with maturity, i.e., the assessed risk that a 
technology might fail.  Interestingly, though technology maturity was a significant 
variable, technology complexity was not.  One reason for this might be derived from 
the way we coded this variable.  An alternative explanation is that complexity is, in 
fact, not a “show stopper” for transition; even complex technologies transition as 
long as they are mature and proven.  
The deeper issue with regard to the information/technology maturity variable 
is the extent to which this variable reflects beliefs and expectations held about 
technology in the broader DoD community.  We raise this issue because an ACTD’s 
transition success does not necessarily mean that the technology will be fully 
deployed or successful when deployed.  Therefore, the idea of COTS technologies 
may have become so powerful among some DoD communities that a high COTS 
quotient becomes a right of passage for ACTD transition.  If this is the case, then 
COTS will indeed be a powerful predictor of transition.  However, it may not be so 
highly correlated with successful deployment and use. 
This issue raises the question of why people come to confidently hold certain 
beliefs and expectations.  These expectations are commonly acknowledged to 
significantly affect the diffusion of difficult-to-evaluate technologies (where, given 
uncertainty of evaluation, adoption is driven by mimicry processes) and those 
technologies that exhibit network externalities (where expectations about the 
adoption of others causes self-fulfilling prophecies—see Rolhfs, 2001).  Therefore, 
we have to be mindful of the effects that can be rendered by the popularity of certain 
ideas, such as the faith placed in COTS technology as a right of passage for ACTDs.  
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COTS is “the way to go,” then the portfolio of ACTD transitions will be made up of 
technologies with high COTS quotients—not because of the eventual military value, 
but because of shared beliefs among organizational members.  
Why Are Organizational Processes Non-significant? 
Results indicating insignificant variables are just as important to this study as 
the significant results.  One has to be careful in interpreting insignificant variables 
because the insignificance might be generated from one of two sources.  First, the 
variable may be inaccurately measured, in which case the insignificant result masks 
a relationship which would be significant if accurately measured.  Second, 
insignificance could be a genuine result.  For the purposes of this discussion, we will 
assume the later case. 
All of the proxies for organizational processes that we measured were 
insignificant, indicating that this variable is not a reliable predictor of ACTD transition.  
We had conjectured that identifying managers by name in the management plan 
might predict transition success based on the hypothesis that mangers might know 
something about the quality of an ACTD and avoid getting allocated to projects with 
poor transition prospects.  However, we found this proxy was insignificant.  We 
thought management-plan depth and clarity of transition strategy might indicate the 
effectiveness of organizational processes for pushing ACTDs through different 
stages and into transition, but both were insignificant.  Timeline requirement, another 
process variable, was similarly insignificant.  The number of parties involved might 
be conjectured as a proxy for organizational complexity, which again was 
insignificant. 
Overall, the insignificance of these variables are important to note because 
they suggest that the organizational processes involved in ACTD transition are 
independent of the transition itself.  On the one hand, this is good because it 
suggests that organizational processes don’t bias the ACTD transition process.  On 
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processes (such as the building of comprehensive management plans) that do not 
appear to have any significant relationship with the end result: the transition record.  
On the other hand, with regard to the earlier literature survey results, none of the 
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Technology Adoption Models 
Benefit-cost uncertainty, organizational externalities and network externalities 
are issues that seem particularly relevant to DoD technology adoption from our 
literature survey.  The ACTD case studies highlighted benefit-cost uncertainty, 
management commitment, the existence of a technology champion and 
expectations about the prospects for future technology transfer.  Benefit-cost 
uncertainty is clearly common to both lists.  As highlighted in the earlier discussion, 
management commitment and the existence of a technology champion are 
mechanisms that help address organizational and network externalities; 
expectations about future adoption prospects are also critical to overcome network 
externalities.  Thus, the four factors identified as significant in the ACTD case 
studies are consistent with the three factors identified as significant in the literature 
survey.  Equally as important, the ACTD case studies did not identify any of the 
factors from the literature survey as insignificant.   
As a result, we will incorporate the three factors from the literature survey, 
cost-benefit uncertainties, organizational externalities and network externalities, into 
models of technology adoption. These are presented to help form a framework for 
future economic experiments and simulations—in which theoretical issues can be 
tested in a controlled environment using actual human reaction and then simulated 
to explore potential policies to foster defense technology adoption.  These are 
stylized graphs and are not drawn to scale.  They are introduced to illustrate the 
basic implications of benefit-cost uncertainty and externalities on defense technology 
adoption. 
Benefit and Cost Uncertainty 
Figure 9 represents the most basic economic situation, in which there are no 
externalities, and the buyer and the end-user are modeled as a single entity.  The 
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represented on the X-axis.  There are three types of users—those who place a high, 
medium or low value on the technology.  Notice that the value to each individual 
user does not change as the number of users increases.  In this illustration, only the 
high value users find it in their interest to adopt, as their value is greater than the 
cost of adopting the technology.  The total benefits increase as an aggregate of the 
individual benefits for each user. 
Value
($$$)













Figure 9. Technology Adoption with Benefit-cost Uncertainty 
If users are uncertain about their net benefit, then the graph will illustrate a 
technology adoption path that mimics that observed in the experiential data.  Users 
may adopt slowly as they attempt to determine what group they are in: high-, 
medium- or low-valued users.  Some medium- and low-value users that misidentify 
themselves may adopt and then de-adopt; high-value users may transition gradually 
as they ascertain that they are indeed high-value users. 
Organizational Externalities 
Figure 10 shows how organizational externalities would affect the total 
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Individual users are still characterized as high-, medium- and low-valued users and 
are uncertain about their identity ex ante, as in Figure 9.  The total benefits the end-
users capture by adopting the new technology is the same as in Figure 9 and 
depicted by the light grey line in Figure 10.  However, organizational or other simple 
externalities provide benefits to the adopting organization that the end-users don’t 
capture; the total benefit line depicted in Figure 10 aggregates the organizational 
and individual end-user benefits.  These organizational benefits might be savings 
accruing to the organization through specialization (CASE) or through 
standardization/improved processes (HTA, RFID). 
Value
($$$)

















Figure 10. Technology Adoption with Benefit-Cost Uncertainty and 
Organizational Externalities 
With organizational externalities, as pictured above, total benefits might 
exceed costs for the medium-value users (including the external organizational 
benefits)—but the individual users’ costs might exceed their individual benefits, 
limiting their incentive to adopt.  In this case, the organization needs to consider 
policies to align the organization’s incentives with the individual end-users.  For 
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end-users act as profit centers; this would lower their costs below their value, 
making it in their interest to adopt.  For DoD technology adoption in the ACTD/JCTD 
program, the OSD might need to subsidize technology adoption by the services.  
Without policies to align organizational and end-user incentives, the organization 
won’t capture the organizational externalities (benefits) associated with technology 
adoption by intra-marginal groups. 
Network Externalities 
Figure 11 shows the effects of network externalities.  As before, individual 
users are still characterized as high-, medium- and low-valued users and are 
uncertain about their identity ex ante.  However, the end-users’ values increase with 
the number of users in the presence of direct or indirect network externalities.  Total 
benefits are, again, an aggregate of all the individual end-users and increase 
exponentially in situations with network externalities.  In the case illustrated here, 
high-value users find it in their interest to adopt the technology regardless of how 
many others have adopted; these end-users represent the Early Market (the 









































exponentially as a sum 























Figure 11. Technology Adoption with  
Benefit-cost Uncertainty and Network Externalities 
The medium-value users would find it in their interest to adopt, but only if 
there were already a critical mass of users—sufficient enough users that their 
benefits exceed their costs.  These end-users might represent the Early Majority in 
the Technology Adoption Lifecycle.  As a self-referencing group, their adoption 
decision requires a commitment from an adequate number of their end-user peer 
group.  The Technology Adoption Chasm becomes difficult to cross if the decision to 
adopt requires a substantial commitment from this class of end-users before their 
benefits exceed their costs.  
The same situation holds for the low-value users in this illustration (the Late 
Majority and Laggards in the Technology Adoption Lifecycle ); they may or may not 
adopt the new technology, depending on the strength of the network externalities.  
The issue here is how to coordinate the actions of the medium- and low-value users.  
It is in best interest of medium-value users to all adopt the new technology, but costs 
exceed benefits for the early adopters in this group—at least until the number of 
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users.  In such cases, the literature emphasizes the value of having a strong 
management commitment and a clearly identified technology champion to signal an 
organizational and industry commitment to crossing the Technology Adoption 
Chasm.  For defense technology transfer, this might include a strong OSD/Service 
Secretary commitment and a clear technology champion within the lead service. 
Proposed Experimental Analysis 
As stated previously, empirical evidence from both the defense and civilian 
sectors indicates that technology adoption typically follows one of several different 
paths: no adoption, complete adoption, partial adoption and partial adoption/de-
adoption.  No adoption and complete adoption are relatively easy to motivate: costs 
exceed benefits for either all or none.  It is more interesting and difficult to explain 
partial adoption and de-adoption, particularly cases in which individual end-users 
partially adopt a new technology while simultaneously supporting the status quo, and 
cases in which end-users successfully adopt the new technology only to later de-
adopt it and return to the status quo.  For defense technology, the Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet (NMCI) is an example of a partially adopted technology that some 
Navy commands have fully embraced while others continue to support both NMCI 
and other conventional architectures (GAO, 2006b; Perkins, 2005). The Advanced 
Technology Ordnance Surveillance (ATOS) system is an example of a technology 
that was adopted by some users only to be later replaced by the pre-existing status 
quo barcode tracking system (Doerr, Gates & Mutty, 2006).   
After surveying the literature, we identified plausible explanations for these 
observed technology adoption patterns: benefit-cost uncertainty, organizational and 
other simple externalities and network externalities.  Conceptually, these situations 
create incentives supporting adoption decisions consistent with the adoption 
patterns observed in practice—particularly the two intermediate cases: partial 
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Unfortunately, we cannot observe incentives in practice—so we can never 
really be sure why decision-makers choose what they choose to do; we can only 
observe their actual decisions.  To explore whether benefit-cost uncertainty, simple 
externalities and network externalities can generate the technology adoption 
patterns observed in practice—particularly partial adoption and de-adoption—we 
need to observe adoption decisions in a controlled incentive environment; 
fortunately, we can create this circumstance through an economic experiment 
(Camerer, 2003). 
Experimental Design 
An economic experiment artificially constructs and controls incentives and 
then tracks how experimental subjects behave based on those incentives.  Subjects 
are paid monetary rewards based on the quality of their decisions; these monetary 
payments are controlled to reflect the incentives being modeled.  Experimental 
results have been found to predict actual decision behavior with reasonable 
accuracy, so the results are robust and transferable (Davis & Holt, 1993). 
Consider the following specification for a technology adoption decision: 
)1())1(1)(1()( iiiiiiii pcpqxpxqvpU   
Where: 
Ui = utility (profit) for subject i 
pi = proportion of subject i’s nodes that have adopted the new technology 
vi = net value of the new technology to actor i (the value of the old technology 
is set to 1) 
qi = proportion of market nodes that have adopted the new technology 
(excluding subject i) 
x = strength/value of network externality in the technology application 
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In this model, Ui is the subject’s utility and the metric tracked to determine the 
subject’s monetary earnings.  Heterogeneity in value can be introduced by varying vi 
across subjects.  Cost-benefit uncertainty can be introduced by giving subjects 
imperfect information about their value of vi; information about vi can improve as the 
experiment progresses.  Network externalities can be modified by varying the value 
of x; there are no network externalities if x = 0.  This model assumes that the 
strength of the network externality is the same for all users; this could be changed by 
indexing x to the individual subject.  Finally, the rate of adoption/de-adoption can be 
limited by limiting the change (positive or negative) in pi from period to period in the 
experiment. 
To explain the model, the first term in the model, )( iii xqvp  , represents the 
value of adopting the new technology—including the subject’s direct value from the 
technology and the value captured from any network externalities associated with 
the new technology for the portion of the industry using the new technology.  The 
second term in the equation, ))1(1)(1( ii qxp  , represents the value from the 
status quo technology, including the subject’s direct value from the technology (set 
to 1) and the value captured from any network externalities associated with this 
technology for the portion of the industry using the status quo technology.  Finally, 
the third term in the model, )1( ii pcp  , measures the cost of supporting two 
technologies.  Notice this term is zero if either pi = 1 or pi = 0; it is maximized when pi 
= 0.5. 
In an experiment using this model, subjects would determine the portion of 
their capacity to switch to the new technology in each period or switch back to the 
old technology (the model could also include switching costs if desired).  The optimal 
decision depends on three factors: the subject’s value of the new technology, vi, 
relative to the old technology (this is not known with certainty at the start of the 
experiment but can be discerned over time); the strength of the network externality 
and the portion of the industry switching to the new technology (past industry 
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future periods are not); and the cost of maintaining dual technologies.  The utility 
(profit) each subject earns in each period is summed and converted to a monetary 
payment at the end of the experiment.  The experimenter can vary the heterogeneity 
of costs across subjects, the level of benefit-cost uncertainty, the level of network 
externalities and the dual-technology maintenance costs.  The experiments would 
verify if the proposed models are likely to generate the technology adoption patterns 
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Summary and Issues for Further Research 
DoD faces significant challenges as it tries to deliver promising new 
technologies to service members quickly and cost-effectively.  This research 
examined the Technology Adoption Lifecycle and the Chasm that accompanies it, 
describing the Technology Adoption Lifecycle in a defense context.  Crossing the 
DoD’s Technology Adoption Chasm involves aligning the incentives for each 
stakeholder in the decision-maker/buyer/end-user chain.  To better understand 
DOD’s technology adoption challenges, we reviewed the academic technology 
diffusion literature to identify the factors associated with successful and unsuccessful 
technology adoption processes.  The literature identified a wide range of factors—
many of which were inapplicable to the defense context and others of which, while 
applicable, provided no normative implications and thus were irrelevant from a policy 
perspective.  The literature review identified six critical factors affecting a 
technology’s ability to cross the defense Technology Adoption Chasm: resolving 
benefit-cost uncertainty; overcoming concerns about losing decision-making control; 
correcting misaligned incentives among different stakeholders within the 
organization; securing management commitment; identifying a clear technology 
champion; and ensuring that a sufficiently large installed based of users or 
complementary goods and services will exist. 
These six factors were further consolidated into three overarching factors: 
benefit-cost uncertainty, organizational and other simple externalities, and direct and 
indirect network externalities.  These three factors capture the complexities of the 
defense technology adoption process that involves multiple decision-makers (the 
joint staff that determines defense requirements, the service sponsors that manage 
the acquisition process and influence the resource allocation process, and the end-
users or warfighters that actually adopt and use the new technology).  Developing 
technologies clearly involve benefit and cost uncertainties.  Organizational 
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within DoD.  Direct and indirect network externalities reflect the joint nature of many 
DoD technologies (fully exploiting their potential requires adoption beyond a single 
service or a single command within a service) and the interrelated nature of defense 
technologies on the battlefield (most defense technologies require significant 
complementary support goods and services and must be integrated with other 
defense technologies). 
A closer look at one of DoD’s advanced technology development programs, 
the ACTD/JCTD program, indicated that experience in this program is generally 
consistent with the factors identified in the literature survey: the importance of 
benefit-cost uncertainty, management commitment (organizational externalities), 
technology champion (network externalities) and expectations about the prospects 
for future technology transfer (network externalities).  These were the primary 
significant variables in these cases, indicating that our literature search focused on 
the appropriate variables. 
The research concluded by presenting conceptual technology adoption 
models that incorporated benefit-cost uncertainty, organizational externalities and 
network externalities.  These models are capable of explaining the diffusion patterns 
observed in both the private sector and the defense department: no adoption, full 
adoption, partial adoption and partial adoption/de-adoption.   
What remains to be seen is if decision-makers will actually respond to the 
incentives in these models in ways that produce the observed adoption patterns.  
The only means to fully test these models is through an appropriately designed set 
of economic experiments.  An experimental model was described to provide this 
validation.  Future research will conduct the suggested economic experiments.  If 
these models are validated, they will become the foundation for further experiments 
and simulations to explore policy options the defense department can consider to 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 61 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of References 
Allison, G. and Zelikow, P., 1999. Essence of Decision. New York: Longman. 
Apodaca, A. (1967). Corn and custom: The introduction of hybrid corn to Spanish 
American farmers in New Mexico. In E.H. Spicer (Ed.), Human problems in 
technological change (Case 2, pp. 35-39). New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Batz, F-J., Peters, K.J., & Janssen, W. (1999). The influence of technology 
characteristics on the rate and speed of adoption. Agricultural Economics, 
21(2),  121-130. 
Bayus, B.L., Jain, S., & Rao, A.G. (1997). Too little, too early: Introduction timing and 
new product performance in the personal digital assistant industry. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 34(1), 50-63. 
Bolton, M.K. (1993). Organizational innovation and substandard performance: When 
is necessity the mother of innovation. Organization Science, 4(1), 57-75. 
Burns, L.R., & Wholey, D.R. (1993). Adoption and abandonment of matrix 
management programs: Effects of organizational characteristics and 
interorganizational networks. The Academy of Management Journal, 36(1), 
106-138. 
Camerer, C.F. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Camison-Zomoza, C., Lapiedra-Alcami, R. Segarra-Cipres, M. & Boronat-Navaro, M. 
(2004). A meta-analysis of innovation and organizational size. Organization 
Studies, 25(3), 331-361. 
Damanpour, F. (1991). Organizational innovations: A meta-analysis of effects of 
determinants and moderators. Academy of Management Journal, 34(3), 555-
590. 
David, P.A. (1986). Understanding the economics of QWERTY: The necessity of 
history. In W.N. Parker (Ed.), Economic history and the modern economist 
(Chapter 4, pp. 30-49). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Davis, D.D., & Holt, C.A.(1993). Experimental economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2004). Defense acquisition guidebook. 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 62 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2006). How are advanced concept 
technology demonstration (ACTD) projects funded? Retrieved May 31, 2007, 
from https://akss.dau.mil/askaprof-
akss/qdetail2.aspx?cgiSubjectAreaID=15&cgiQuestionID=16531  
Dew, N., & Read, S. (2007). The more we get together: Coordinating network 
externality product introduction in the RFID industry. Technovation, 27(10), 
569-581. 
Dewar, R.D., & Dutton, J.E. (1986). The adoption of radical and incremental 
innovations: An empirical analysis. Management Science, 32(11), 1422-1433. 
DoD. (2003, May 12a). The defense acquisition system (DoD Directive 5000.1). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
DoD. (2003, May 12b). Operation of the defense acquisition system (DoD Instruction 
5000.2). Washington, DC: Author. 
Doerr, K., Gates, W., & Mutty, J. (2006). A hybrid approach to the valuation of 
RFID/MEMS technology applied to ordnance inventory. International Journal 
of Production Economics, 103(2), 726-741. 
Drummond, M., & Weatherly, H. (2000). Implementing the findings of health 
technology assessments: If the CAT got out of the bag, can the TAIL wag the 
dog? International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care, 16(1), 
1-12. 
Ewusi-Mensah, K., & Przasnyski, Z.H. (1991). On information systems project 
abandonment: An exploratory study of organizational practices. MIS 
Quarterly, 15(1), 67-86. 
Gaba, V. (2006). Learning while innovating: The abandonment of corporate venture 
capital programs. Presented at the Smith Entrepreneurship Research 
Conference. College Park, MD: Robert H. Smith School of Business. 
GAO. (1998). Defense acquisition advanced concept technology demonstration 
program can be improved. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military 
Research and Development, Committee on National Security, House of 
Representatives. Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2002). Defense acquisition: Factors affecting outcomes of advanced concept 
technology demonstrations (GAO-03-52). Report to the Subcommittee on 
Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, US 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 63 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
GAO. (2005). Defense logistics: Better strategic planning can help ensure DoD's 
successful implementation of passive radio frequency identification. Report to 
Congressional committees. Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2006a). Best practices: Stronger practices needed to improve DoD 
technology transition processes. Report to Congressional committees. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2006b). Information technology DoD needs to ensure that Navy Marine Corps 
intranet program is meeting goals and satisfying customers. Report to 
congressional addressees. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS78756 
Geroski, P.A. (2003). The evolution of new markets. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Greve, H.R. (1995). Jumping ship: The diffusion of strategy abandonment. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(3), 444-473. 
Griliches, Z. (1957). Hybrid corn: An exploration in the economics of technological 
change. Econometrica, 25(4), 501-522. 
Griliches, Z. (1958). Research costs and social returns: Hybrid corn and related 
innovations. Journal of Political Economy, 66(5), 419-431. 
Intrapairot, A.. & Quaddus, M. (1998, July). Adoption and diffusion of data 
warehousing technology: A systems dynamic approach. In Proceedings of the 
16th international conference of The System Dynamics Society. Quebec City: 
System Dynamics Society. 
Karahanna, E., Straub, D.W., & Chervany, N.L. (1999). Information technology 
adoption across time: A cross-sectional comparison of pre-adoption and post-
adoption beliefs. MIS Quarterly, 23(2), 183-213. 
Katz, M., & Shapiro, K. (1986). Technology adoption in the presence of network 
externalities. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 822-841.  
Koundouri, P., Nauges, C., & Tzouvelekas, V. (n.d.). Endogenous technology 
adoption under production risk: Theory and application to irrigation technology 
(Working Paper 0411). University of Crete, Department of Economics. 
Libmann, F. (1990, December). Study on technology transfer databases. Online 
Information 90: 14th International Online Information Meeting Proceedings 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 64 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Longo, R.M.J. (1990). Information transfer and the adoption of agricultural 
innovations. Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 41(1), 
1-9. 
Mason, R., & Halter, A.N. (1980). Risk attitude and the forced discontinuance of 
agricultural practices. Rural Sociology, 45(3), 435-447. 
McNamara, K.T., Wetzstein, M.E., & Douce G.K. (1991). Factors affecting peanut 
farmer adoption of integrated pest management. Review of Agricultural 
Economics, 13(1), 129-139. 
McWilliams, G. (2007, February 15). Wal-mart’s radio-tracked inventory hits static. 
Wall Street Journal. p. B1. 
Meyer, A.D., & Goes, J.B. (1988). Organizational assimilation of innovations: A 
multilevel contextual analysis. The Academy of Management Journal, 31(4), 
897-923. 
Moore, G. (1999). Crossing the chasm: Marketing and selling high-tech products to 
mainstream customers. New York: Harper Business.  
Mol, M.H. (1998). Advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs): Are they 
relevant in today’s acquisition environment? Unpublished MBA Report, Air 
Command and Staff College, Air University.  
Mowery, D., & Rosenberg, N. 1979. The influence of market demand upon 
innovation: a critical review of some recent empirical studies. Research 
Policy, 8: 102-153. 
Nair, H., Chintagunta, P., & Dube, J-P. (2004). Empirical analysis of indirect network 
effects in the market for personal digital assistants. Quantitative Marketing 
and Economics, 2(1), 23-58.  
Norman, R.J., Corbitt, G.F., Butler, M.C., & McElroy D.D. (1989). CASE technology 
transfer: A case study of unsuccessful change. Journal of Systems 
Management, 40(5), 33-37. 
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (AS&C). (2004a). ACTD 
guidelines: Formulation, selection, and initiation. Retrieved September 12, 
2007, from http://www.acq.osd.mil/jctd/formulat.htm 
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (AS&C). (2004b). ACTD 
guidelines: Transition. Retrieved September 12, 2007, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/jctd/transit.htm 
Oladele, O.I., & Adekoya,  A.E. (2006). Implication of farmers’ propensity to 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 65 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
cowpea varieties for extension education in Southwestern Nigeria. The 
Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 12(3), 195-200. 
O'Rourke, R. (2001). Navy network-centric warfare concept key programs and 
issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress. 
Panzano, P.C., & Roth, D. (2006). The decision to adopt evidence-based and other 
innovative mental health practices: Risky business? Psychiatric Services, 
57(8), 1153-1161. 
Perkins, S. (2005). Navy Marine Corp intranet (NMCI). Case Study. Babson Park, 
MD: Babson Executive Education. 
Phelps, M., & Wideman, J.S. (2007). ACTDs: Management plans as predictors of 
transition (Master’s Thesis). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Postrel, S.R. (1990). Competing networks and proprietary standards: The case of 
quadraphonic sound. Journal of Industrial Economics, 39(2), 169-185. 
Price, T.J., Lamb, M.C., & Wetzstein, M.E. (2005). Technology choice under 
changing peanut policies. Agricultural Economics, 33(1), 11-19. 
Rahim, M.M., Kahn M.K.,, & Selamat, M.H. (1987). Adoption versus abandonment of 
CASE tools: Lessons from two organizations. Information Technology & 
People, 10(4), 316-329. 
Rao, H., Greve H.R., & Davis, G.F. (2001). Fool’s gold: Social proof in the initiation 
and abandonment of coverage by Wall Street analysts. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 46(3), 502-526. 
Rogers, E. (1995). Diffusions of innovations. New York: The Free Press. 
Rohlfs, J. (2001). Bandwagon effects in high-technology industries. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Rohlfs, J.H. (2001). Picture phone. In J.H. Rohlfs (Ed.), Bandwagon effects in high 
technology (Chapter 8, pp. 83-90). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Rosenberg, N. (1996), ‘Uncertainty and Technological Change.’ In Fuhrer, J.C. and 
Sneddon Little, J., (eds.) Technology and Growth: Conference Series No.40. 
Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
Saha, A., Love, H.A., & Schwart, R. (1994). Adoption of emerging technologies 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 66 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Schang, S.L. (2007). Crossing the technology adoption chasm in the presence of 
network externalities: Implications for DoD (Master’s Thesis). Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School.  
Shachtman, N. (2007, May). The Army’s new Land Warrior gear: Why soldiers don’t 
like it. Popular Mechanics. 
Sheng, O.R.L., Hu, P.J.-H. Wei C.-P., & Ma, P.-C. (1999). Organizational 
management of telemedicine technology: Conquering time and space 
boundaries in Health Care services. IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management, 26(3), 265-278. 
Shy, O. (2001). The economics of network industries. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Sofranko, A., Swenson B., & Samy, M. (2004). An examination of the extent of 
innovation discontinuance, the motivations of farmers who discontinue an 
innovation, and implications for extension. In AIAEE, Proceedings of the 20th 
Annual Conference (pp. 694-705). Dublin, Ireland: AIAEE. 
Solis, W.M. (2006). Defense logistics: More efficient use of active RFID tags could 
potentially avoid millions in unnecessary purchases. Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office. Retrieved Date, Sept. 12, 2007, from 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS68171  
Sullivan, M.J. (2005). Defense technology development management process can 
be strengthened for new technology transition programs. Report prepared for 
Congressional committees. Washington, DC: Government Accountability 
Office. 
Tornatzky, L.G., & Klein, K.J. (1982). Innovation characteristics and innovation 
adoption-implementation: A meta-analysis of findings. IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management, 29(1), 28-45. 
US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). (2007). Joint capabilities 
integration and development system (CJCS Instruction 3170.01F). 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 67 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Appendix 1. Literature Review 




Apodaca, A. (1967). Corn and custom: The introduction of hybrid corn to Spanish American farmers in New Mexico. In E.H. Spicer (Ed.), 
Human problems in technological change (Case 2, pp. 35-39). New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Hybrid Corn Individual Adopter/De- Case Study Reasons for Adoption 
 adopter (Farmer)   Increased Yield   
   Reasons for De-adoption 
   Poor Quality (Taste and Texture)   
Batz, F-J., Peters, K.J., & Janssen, W. (1999). The influence of technology characteristics on the rate and speed of adoption. Agricultural 
Economics, 21(2),  121-130. 
Modern Dairy Techniques Technology Characteristics Econometric Dependent Variables = Rate/Speed of Current Adoption 
    Relative Complexity (-)   
   Relative Risk (-)   
   Relative Investment (-)   
   Dependent Variable = Speed to Completed Adoption 
   Relative Complexity (-) Relative Risk 
    Relative Investment 
Griliches, Z. (1957). Hybrid corn: An exploration in the economics of technological change. Econometrica, 25(4), 501-522. 
Hybrid Corn Crop Reporting Districts/  Econometric Dependent Variable = Date of Hybrid Corn Origin Region 
 States   Market Density (-)   
   
Date of Origin in Immediate 
     Neighborhood (+)   
   Dependent Variable = Rate of Acceptance of Hybrid Corn 
   Average Corn Acre per Farm (+) Standard of Living 
   
Ave Diff btwn Hybrid & Traditional  
     Corn Yield (+) 
Importance of Corn as ‘ 
     Crop 
   Pre-hybrid Average Yield (+) Total Capital per Farm 
   
Dependent Variable = Long-run Equilibrium Percentage of 
Acreage Planted to Hybrid Seed 
   Average Corn Acre per Farm (+) Value of Land and  
   Pre-hybrid Average Yield (+)      Buildings per Farm 
   Total Capital per Farm (+)   
Griliches, Z. (1958). Research costs and social returns: Hybrid corn and related innovations. Journal of Political Economy, 66(5), 419-431. 
Hybrid Corn Adoption Environment Cost-benefit Analysis Social Rate of Return to Research Investment 
 Hybrid Corn Market  Public and Private Research 
Expenditures - Survey 
 
   
Increase in Corn Production with Price-change Adjustment 
- Net Social returns 
   5% and 10% discount rate   
Koundouri, P., Nauges, C., & Tzouvelekas, V. (n.d.). Endogenous technology adoption under production risk: Theory and application to 
irrigation technology (Working Paper 0411). University of Crete, Department of Economics. (Do not quote) 
Irrigation Technology 
(Risk Reducing) 
Individual Adopter (Farmer) Econometric Dependent Variable = Marginal Contribution of Input to 
Expected Profit 
    Variance of Profit (+)   
   Skewness of Profit (-)   
   Dependent Variable = Adoption of Irrigation Technology 
   Age (-) Clayey Limestone Soil 
   Education (+) Marly Limestone Soil 
   Aridity Index (+) Rethymno 
   Debt (+)   
   Extension Visits (+)   
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   Relative Risk Premium (+)   
   Subsidies (+)   
   Clayey Sandy Soil (+)   
   Chania District (-)   
      Lasithi District (+)   
Longo, R.M.J. (1990). Information transfer and the adoption of agricultural innovations. Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science, 41(1), 1-9. 
Farming Technology Information Source for Econometric Dependent Variable = Adoption of Crop Technology 
(Crop and Animal 
Husbandry) 
    Technology 
Individual Adopter (Farmer) 
(Analysis of Variance) Exposure and Intensity of Mass  
     Media   
   
Exposure & Interpersonal ‘’ 
     Communication   
   
Source of First Contacts with ‘ 
     Innovations   
   
Dependent Variable = Adoption of Animal Husbandry 
Technology 
   
Source of First Contacts with  
     Innovations 
Exposure and Intensity 
     of Mass Media 
     
Exposure &  
     Interpersonal  
     Communication 
Mason, R., & Halter, A.N. (1980). Risk attitude and the forced discontinuance of agricultural practices. Rural Sociology, 45(3), 435-447. 
Open Field Burning of 
Post- Harvest Residue Individual Adopter Econometric 
Dependent Variable = Decision to Adopt Alternative 
Practice 
(Grass Seed Crops)    Risk Attitude Farm Income 
    Acres Grass Seed Farmed   
McNamara, K.T., Wetzstein, M.E., & Douce G.K. (1991). Factors affecting peanut farmer adoption of integrated pest management. Review of 
Agricultural Economics, 13(1), 129-139. 
Integrated Pest 
Management Individual Adopter –  Econometric 
Dependent Variable = Decision to Adopt Integrated Pest 
management Practices 
 Characteristics   Producer Age Hazard 
    Producer Education Farm Experience 
    Percent Farm Income Total Income 
    Yield IPM Nonpeanut Crop 
    Extension Requests Nematode Test 
    Forward Contracting Literature read 
    Extension IPM Corp Insurance 
      Animal Production 
      Quota 
      Irrigation 
      Percent Peanuts 
      Asset 
      Debt 
Oladele, O.I., & Adekoya,  A.E. (2006). Implication of farmers’ propensity to discontinue adoption of downey-mildew resistant maize and 
improved cowpea varieties for extension education in Southwestern Nigeria. The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 12(3), 
195-200. 
Downy-mildew Resistant Adoption Environment of Econometric Dependent Variable = De-adoption of Maize 
Maize Individual De-adopter    Extension Visit to Reinforce Tech Attitude 
Improved Cowpea       (Farmer)  Feedback Provision (-) Marketability 
     Varieties   Input Availability (+)   
   Dependent Variable = De-adoption of Cowpea 
   Attitude (+) Extension Visit 
   Marketability (-) Feedback Provision 
        Input Availability 
Price, T.J., Lamb, M.C., & Wetzstein, M.E. (2005). Technology choice under changing peanut policies. Agricultural Economics, 33(1), 11-19. 
Peanut Production Peanut Market Real Options Model 
Dependent Variable = De-adoption of Dryland Production 
Techniques 
Technology    Price Support (-) Eliminate Price Support 
(Dryland versus Irrigation)   Dependent Variable = Adoption of Irrigation Technology 
   
Complete Elimination of Price  
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      Price Supports (-)   
Saha, A., Love, H.A., & Schwart, R. (1994). Adoption of emerging technologies under output uncertainty. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 76(4), 836-846. 
Bovine Somatotropin  Individual Adopter (Farmer) Econometric Dependent Variable = Whether Heard of bST 
(bST)    Age (+) Herd Size 
   Education (+)   
   Dependent Variable = Whether to Adopt bST 
   Herd Size (+) Efficiency/Productivity 
   Education (+) Plans to Expand 
   
Experience (-) Prior Experience with  
     Adoption 
   
Dependent Variable = Intensity of bST Adoption within 
Herd 
   Herd Size (+) Efficiency/Productivity 
   Education (+)   
   Plans to Expand (+)   
   Experience (-)   
      Prior Experience with Adoption (+)   
Sofranko, A., Swenson B., & Samy, M. (2004). An examination of the extent of innovation discontinuance, the motivations of farmers who 
discontinue an innovation, and implications for extension. In AIAEE, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference (pp. 694-705). Dublin, 
Ireland: AIAEE. 
Value-enhanced Grains Individual Adopter/De- Survey Reasons to Adopt Reasons to De-Adopt 
 adopter (Farmer)   Increase Profit (81%) Not Profitable (58%) 
   
Trial Period (51%)  
Diversify Farm Ops (39%) 
Difficulty Locating  
     Markets (49%) 
   
Get 1st Hand Experience (37%) 
Encouraged by Input Suppliers  
Inadequate Storage ‘ 
     Facilities (39%) 
   
     (19%) Lacked Technical  
     Information (26%) 
    
No Longer Interested  
     (11%) 
Health Care 
Drummond, M., & Weatherly, H. (2000). Implementing the findings of health technology assessments: If the CAT got out of the bag, can the 
TAIL wag the dog? International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care, 16(1), 1-12. 
Health Technology Individual Non-adopters Literature Review Reasons for Failure to Diffuse 
Assessments    Language barrier   
   Different incentives/perspectives   
   Lack of reliability   
   Lack of consensus   
   Poor timeliness   
Panzano, P.C., & Roth, D. (2006). The decision to adopt evidence-based and other innovative mental health practices: Risky business? 
Psychiatric Services, 57(8), 1153-1161. 
Mental Health Practices Individual Adopter Econometric 
Dependent Variable = Decision Stage (i.e., Frontrunner, 
Early Adopters, etc.) 
 (Organization) (Baron and Kenny's 4  Risk Management Capacity (+) Risk Propensity 
  step approach) Dependent Variable = Perceived Risk 
   Risk Management Capacity (-)   
   Dependent Variable = Decision Stage 
   Perceived Risk (-)   
   Dependent Variable = Decision Stage 
   Perceived Risk (-) 
Risk-management  
     Capacity 
   ANOVA on Dependent Variable = Decision Stage 
   Perceived Risk Scientific Evidence 
   Experiential Evidence Compatibility  
   Availability of Dedicated Resources Knowledge Set  
     
Risk-management ‘ 
     Capacity 
     Ease of Use 
     Risk Propensity 
     
Learning  
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Management's Attitude  
     toward Change 
Sheng, O.R.L., Hu, P.J.-H. Wei C.-P., & Ma, P.-C. (1999). Organizational management of telemedicine technology: Conquering time and 
space boundaries in Health Care services. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 26(3), 265-278. 
Telemedicine Individual Adopter/De- Conceptual Model Reasons to Adopt Reasons to De-Adopt 
 adopter (Organization)   Build Service in Core Competence Immature Technology 
   Self-sufficiency No Constraints/Priorities 
   Service Financing No Compatibility with  
   Change Management     Existing Tech Base 
   Intertechnology Management No Incentivising Use  
   Budget Lack of Management 
      Timetable       Commitment 
Organization 
Bolton, M.K. (1993). Organizational innovation and substandard performance: When is necessity the mother of innovation. Organization 
Science, 4(1), 57-75. 
R&D Consortium Individual De-adopter Econometric Dependent Variable = Adoption of MCC 
 
    (Organization)’ 
Individual Consortiums   
Slack (+) Performance (Earnings- 
     per-Share) 
     R&D Intensity 
   Dependent Variable = Adoption of SPC 
   
R&D Intensity (+) Performance  
     (Earnings/Share) 
     Slack 
   Dependent Variable = Adoption of COS 
   
R&D Intensity (+) Performance 
     (Earnings/Share) 
     Slack 
   Dependent Variable = Adopters of MCC 
   Performance (Earnings/Share) (+)   
   Slack (-)   
   R&D Intensity (+)   
   Dependent Variable = Adopters of SPC 
   Performance (Earnings/Share) (+)   
   Slack (-)   
   R&D Intensity (+)   
   Dependent Variable = Adopters of COS 
   
R&D Intensity (+) Performance  
     (Earnings/Share) 
     Slack 
   Dependent Variable = Early Adopters 
   Performance (Earnings/Share) (-) R&D Intensity 
   Slack (+)   
Burns, L.R., & Wholey, D.R. (1993). Adoption and abandonment of matrix management programs: Effects of organizational characteristics 
and interorganizational networks. The Academy of Management Journal, 36(1), 106-138. 
Matrix Management  Individual Adopter/De- Econometric Dependent Variable = Adoption of Unit Management 
Program (Unit  Adopter (Hospital)   Outpatient Diversity (+) Emergency Diversity 
Management)   Teaching Diversity (+) Organizational Size 
   Prestige (+) Organizational Slack 
   Reports (+) Structural Equivalence 
   Regional Force of Adoption (+) Center-Periphery Effect 
   Local Force of Adoption (+) Periphery-Center Effect 
     
Time at Risk for  
     Adoption 
   
Dependent Variable = Early Adoption of Unit Management 
(1971 or Earlier) 
   Teaching Diversity (+) Emergency Diversity 
   Organizational Size (+) Outpatient Diversity 
   Prestige (+) Organizational Slack 
   Time at Risk for Adoption +) Reports 
     
Regional Force of  
    Adoption 
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Dependent Variable = Late Adoption of Unit Management 
(1972-78) 
   Regional Force of Adoption (+) Emergency Diversity 
     Outpatient Diversity 
     Teaching Diversity 
     Organizational Size 
     Organizational Slack 
     Prestige 
     Reports 
     Local Force of Adoption 
     
Time at Risk for  
     Adoption 
   
Dependent Variable = Adoption by Nonacceptance Group 
in Late Period 
   Outpatient Diversity (+) Emergency Diversity 
   Organizational Size (+) Teaching Diversity 
   Regional Force of Adoption (+) Organizational Slack 
     Prestige 
     Reports 
     Local Force of Adoption 
     
Time at Risk for  
     Adoption 
   
Dependent Variable = Adoption by Acceptance Group in 
Late Period 
     Emergency Diversity 
     Outpatient Diversity 
     Teaching Diversity 
     Organizational Size 
     Organizational Slack 
     Prestige 
     Reports 
     
Regional Force of 
Adoption 
     Local Force of Adoption 
     
Time at Risk for 
Adoption 
   
Dependent Variable = De-adoption of Unit Management 
(1962-78) 
   Outpatient Diversity (-) Emergency Diversity 
   Regional Force of Adoption (+) Teaching Diversity 
   Proportional Change in Beds—Prior  Organizational Size 
         Year (-) Organizational Slack 
     Prestige 
     Reports 
     Local Force of Adoption 
     
Change in Outpatient ‘ 
     Diversity—Prior Year 
     
Time at Risk for  
     Adoption 
Gaba, V. (2006). Learning while innovating: The abandonment of corporate venture capital programs. Presented at the Smith 
Entrepreneurship Research Conference. College Park, MD: Robert H. Smith School of Business. 
Corporate Venture  Individual De-adopter Econometric Dependent Variable = Probability of De-adoption 
Capital Program (Organization)   Sales (Size) (-) Age 
   Slack (-)   
   Return on NASDAQ (-)   
   Distance to Silicon Valley (+)   
   Year of Adoption (+)   
   CVC Outcome (-)   
   Internal R&D Outcome (+)   
   Prior De-adopters in Industry (+)   
   Mean Patents Prior De-adopters (+)   
   Prior De-adopters in State (+)   
   
Distance*Prior De-adopters in  
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Distance*Mean Patents Prior  
     Abandoners (+)   
   
Yr of Adoption*Pri Abandoners in 
Industry (+)   
   
Yr of Adopt*Mn Patents Prior  
     Abandoners (+)   
   
Year of Adoption*Prior Abandoners  
     in State (+)   
   
CVC Outcome*Prior Abandoners in  
     Industry (-)   
   
CVC Outcome*Mn Patents Prior 
Abandoners (-)   
      
CVC Outcome*Prior Abandoners in  
     State (-)   
Libmann, F. (1990, December). Study on technology transfer databases. Online Information 90: 14th International Online Information 
Meeting Proceedings (pp. 193-204). Oxford:  Limited Information. 
Technology Transfer Technology Characteristics Literature Survey,  Reasons for Failure to Diffuse 
Databases 
 
     Survey, 
Interviews 
User unfamiliarity & costs to learn  
     technology   
   
Lack of informational ads about  
     technology   
   
No dominant design or industry  
     standard   
   Lack of complementary services   
   
Lack of service support, regular  
     updates, etc.   
   
Lack of mrkt seg & targeting by  
     producers   
   Competition   
      Lemons problem   
Rao, H., Greve H.R., & Davis, G.F. (2001). Fool’s gold: Social proof in the initiation and abandonment of coverage by Wall Street analysts. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(3), 502-526. 
Coverage of NASDAQ 
Firms 
Individual Adopter/De- 
     adopter (Analyst/Broker) Econometric Dependent Variable = Adoption 
 Firm Characteristics      (Cox Model) Current Analysts Covering Firm (+) Average Market Value 
 
Market Environment      (Failure-Time) Status of Current Analysts Covering  
     Firm (+) 
Status of Recent  
     Adopters 
   Recent Adoptions (+) Recent De-adoptions 
   Market-adjusted Returns (+) Status of Recent De- 
   Variance in Returns (-)      adopters 
   Institutional Ownership (+)   
   Market Makers for Firm (+)   
   Analysts Covering Industry (+)   
   Dependent Variable = Earnings Overestimation 
   Recent Adoptions (+)   
   Status of Recent Adopters (+)   
   Dependent Variable = Time to De-adoption 
   Market-adjusted Returns (+) Recent De-adoptions 
   
Variance in Returns (-) 
Market Makers for Firm (-) 
Status of Recent De- 
     adopters 
   
Current Analysts Covering Firm (+) 
Status of Recent Adopters (+) 
Status of Current  
     Analysts in Firm 
   Recent Adoptions at Time of Recent Adoptions 
        Addition (-) Analysts in Industry 
   Status of Recent Adopters at Average Market Value 
        Addition (-) Institutional Ownership 
      Earnings Overestimation (-)   
Information Technology 
Bayus, B.L., Jain, S., & Rao, A.G. (1997). Too little, too early: Introduction timing and new product performance in the personal digital 
assistant industry. Journal of Marketing Research, 34(1), 50-63. 
Personal Digital Assistant Market Environment Game-Theory Model Reasons for Failure to Diffuse 
(PDA) Technology Characteristics 
    (Organization) Case Study 
Overestimated market size  
Underestimated quality desired 
Market size, product  
    quality and launch  
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Medium to High Benefits      product success 
Ewusi-Mensah, K., & Przasnyski, Z.H. (1991). On information systems project abandonment: An exploratory study of organizational 
practices. MIS Quarterly, 15(1), 67-86. 






    
Strategically Important  
Urgently Needed 
Disagreement About  
     Project/Politics 
   Low to Medium Risk Management change 
   
Moderate to Highly Complex  
Highly Structured 
End-users Resistant to  
     Change 
   Later Stages of Development Unaligned Incentives 
   Multiple Departmental Stakeholders Unimportant Factors 
   Future Costs Expected to Outweigh  IS Professionals 
        Benefits Technology 
   Future Costs Expected to Outweigh Length to Completion 
   Benefits Overall Cost 
    Sunk Costs 
    Sunk Costs 
Intrapairot, A.. & Quaddus, M. (1998, July). Adoption and diffusion of data warehousing technology: A systems dynamic approach. In 
Proceedings of the 16th international conference of The System Dynamics Society. Quebec City: System Dynamics Society. 
Data Warehousing Individual Adopter within Conceptual Model Strategies to Successfully Diffuse Technology 
Technology Organization (Staff) (Multiple Criteria 
Decision Making) 
Training Support to Affect Attitudes  
     and Vision   
   Cooperation Between IT and Users   
   Increase User Friendliness   
   
Top Management Support (Tech  
     Champion)   
   
Increased Positive Features of  
     Technology   
Karahanna, E., Straub, D.W., & Chervany, N.L. (1999). Information technology adoption across time: A cross-sectional comparison of pre-
adoption and post-adoption beliefs. MIS Quarterly, 23(2), 183-213. 
MS Windows Individual Adopter within Econometric (Partial Dependent Variable = Attitude toward Adopting 
 Organization (Staff) Least Squares) Ease of Use (+) Image 
   Perceived Usefulness (+)   
   Visibility (+)   
   Result Demonstrability (+)   
   Trialability (-)   
   Dependent Variable = Subjective Norm toward Adopting 
   
Normative Believes x Motivation  
     (NBM) Top Management (+) 
NBM Local Computer  
     Specialists 
   NBM Supervisor (+)   
   NBM Peers (+)   
  NBM MIS Department (+)   
   NBM Friends (+)   
   Dependent Variable = Behavioral Intention to Adopt 
   Subjective Norm for Adopting (+) Perceived Voluntariness 
     Attitude toward Adopting 
   Dependent Variable = Attitude toward Continuing Use 
   Image (+) Ease of Use 
   Perceived Usefulness (+) Visibility 
     Result Demonstrability 
     Trialability 
   
Dependent Variable = Subjective Norm toward Continuing 
Use 
   
Normative Believes x Motivation  
     (NBM) Top Management (+) 
NBM MIS Department 
NBM Friends 
  NBM Supervisor (-)  
   NBM Peers (+)   
   NBM Local Computer Specialist (+)   
   
Dependent Variable = Behavioral Intention to Continue 
Using 
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  Perceived Voluntariness (-)      Use 
Norman, R.J., Corbitt, G.F., Butler, M.C., & McElroy D.D. (1989). CASE technology transfer: A case study of unsuccessful change. Journal of 
Systems Management, 40(5), 33-37. 
Computer-aided Software Individual Adopter Case Study Reasons for Failed Adoption 
Engineering Technology (Organization)   Resistance to change   
(CASE)   High learning curve   
   Lack of visible benefits   
   
Lack of communication about  
     industry pressure for  
     implementation   
   
Lack of clear and consistent  
     change strategy   
   Lack of CASE champion   
   
Perceived lack of management  
     commitment   
Rahim, M.M., Kahn, M.K., & Selamat, M.H. (1987). Adoption versus abandonment of CASE tools: Lessons from two organizations. 
Information Technology & People, 10(4), 316-329. 
Computer-aided Software Individual Adopter Case Study Reasons for Successful Adoption versus Failed Adoption 
Engineering Technology (Organization)   Clear goals   
(CASE)   Structured method already in place   
   
Created a selection committee to  
     develop criteria for tool   
   
Created a clear/focused  
     implementation plan   
   
Extensive communication between  
     users and developers   
   Extensive pilot program   
   
Established standard software  
      development methods   
   Reduced the learning curve   
   CASE champion   
   Extensive pre/post training   
Miscellaneous 
David, P.A. (1986). Understanding the economics of QWERTY: The necessity of history. In W.N. Parker (Ed.), Economic history and the 
modern economist (Chapter 4, pp. 30-49). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
QWERTY Keyboard Market Structure Case Study Reasons Why Never De-Adopted 
    
Large, endogenous skilled labor  
     population   
   
High switching costs of labor  
     population   
   Economies-of-scale   
   
Availability complementary  
     products   
   Technical interrelatedness   
Dew, N., & Read, S. (2007). The more we get together: Coordinating network externality product introduction in the RFID industry. 
Technovation, 27(10), 569-581. 
RFID Adoption Environment Market Structure  
Literature Survey 
Dependent Variable = Decision to Adopt  Subject to 
Network Externalities 
   Focal Points  
    Common Knowledge  
    Leadership  
Dewar, R.D., & Dutton, J.E. (1986). The adoption of radical and incremental innovations: An empirical analysis. Management Science, 
32(11), 1422-1433. 
Footwear Manufacturing Individual Adopter Econometric Dependent Variable = Adoption 
Technology (Organization)   Depth of Knowledge Resources (+) External Exposure 
   Size (+) Managerial Attitudes 
     Centralization 
     
Organizational  
     Complexity 
Greve, H.R. (1995). Jumping ship: The diffusion of strategy abandonment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(3), 444-473. 
Radio Station Formats Individual De-Adopter Econometric Dependent Variable = De-adoption 
     (Organization)   Sale of the Station (+) Small Market 
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Abandonment by Corporate  
     Contacts (+) Same-format Density 
   Abandoned by Market Contacts (+) Market Population 
     Top-10 Market 
     11-25 Market 
     
Abandonment by Direct 
Competitors 
Postrel, S.R. (1990). Competing networks and proprietary standards: The case of quadraphonic sound. Journal of Industrial Economics, 
39(2), 169-185. 
Quadraphonic Sound Market Environment Conceptual Model Reasons for De-Adoption 
    Retailers' low expectations   
   Low quality of early tech releases   
   Poor quality of early versions   
   
Competing versions split installed 
     user base   
   Backwards compatibility   
   
Low availability of complementary 
     goods   
Rohlfs, J.H. (2001). Picture phone. In J.H. Rohlfs (Ed.), Bandwagon effects in high technology (Chapter 8, pp. 83-90). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Picturephone Developers of Technology Case Study Reasons for Failure to Diffuse 
  Questionnaire Lack of skilled sales techniques   
   Lack of patience for acceptance   
   
Benefits not obvious over regular 
     phone   
   Regulatory regime   
   No awareness of start-up problem   
   Possible Solutions 
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